I wish to state I am aware that a problem with the Electoral College
is the use of FPTP inside of states.
----------------------------
At 03:13 03.10.00 +0000 Tuesday, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
...
>Demorep continues:
>
>U.S.A. voters are rather simple minded regarding math due to the massively
>rotten public schools.
>
>I reply:
>
>Using Condorcet doesn't require any math. Anyone can rank their
>choices.
What do they do when Condorcet returns the wrong number of winners?.
Whatever the unacceptability of STV, Condorcet can be regarded as worse
if it finds the wrong number of winners.
>Demorep continues:
>
>Thus, Condorcet (head to head) math is somewhat difficult for lots of
>ex-public school folks
>
>I reply:
>
>Nothing difficult about ranking our choices.
However there is something difficult about making do with 0 winners.
On repairing Condorcet. Once it is repaired it becomes a very
different method. Either Mike was saying have it fail in practice
or was implicitly suggesting a repaired Condorcet variant be used.
Without being repaired (fixed so that it returns the right number of
winners), Condorcet passes my axioms, I guess. It is a VERY different
method when it is repaired. It is not possible to repair a Condorcet
variant method enough and keep it sufficiently similar to the
Condorcet method so that it can retain the name "repaired Condorcet
variant". I mean, it needs to pick the candidate that beats all
others. That can't be done with the papers (AB),(B),(C).
IRV can be repaired and tweaked and still be called "an improved IRV".
------------------------
The Approval Vote has the problem that people can grab at power by
adding preferences. That sounds like fun.
Once they add the k-th preference, then they stab themselves down
and the important parties voted for with earlier preferences miss
out. Which party would win depends a lot on the nuances of the hints
on the voting papers that say how many marks ought be written onto
the paper.
I am sure Mike Ossipoff CAN explain that more, if the readers are
interested. You might as well, since the CVD could be reading this
and aware that their method is free of that defect.
>So what would EM do if its act were together? Would we fight IRV
>in a united way? Good, then let's do so. Join LWV. You too, Demorep.
>And write to Alaska's Republican Party, & tell them that Condorcet
>or Approval would be a big improvement over their IRV proposal. And
>Approval is so much easier to propose & implement.
?Advocate a method that is not truncation resistant and/or that
returns the wrong number of winners, or gives too much power to a
voter?.
In my opinion, IRV is better than those 2 methods. That use of the
word "Condorcet" must be rough and intended to be disregarded.
------------------------------------------------------------------
CVD - verifiability that they wouldn't promote a trashy method
Suppose IRV was parameterised and it could be gradually made worse.
Just exactly when would the CVD regard IRV as no longer suitable
for being recommended to any government or society?. The unaltered
"IRV" will alter +16% support into -x% support, where x is near 0%.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
At 03:04 03.10.00 +0000 Tuesday, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
...
>Let me define Monotonicity:
>
>If a voter changes his vote so that he votes candidate X higher
>, but doesn't change his ordering of the other candidates, then
>that shouldn't cause X to lose, if X would have won before the change.
This is not as strongly stated as it could be, so your rule is failed
by my meta-rule 3.
Why is this definition so much worse than the definition I just
posted?. It is failed by my meta-rule 3. Is it in print somewhere?.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
The 8th hairy CVD leg of the CVD. Maybe the information on IRV at the
CVD website is a blind and the CVD doesn't really advocate IRV.
Maybe it is a brokering agency for bribes. I didn't see any online
statements on the maximum tolerable monotonicity violation that the
CVD would tolerate (no lower limits). If it was a military operation
they would have lower limits set and any council that couldn't adapt
would have to go to a different lobbying group.
The CVD -- the Ghostbusters of the cities;
The Council of Victorian Democracy.