On 28 Sep 2002 at 16:17, Markus Schulze wrote: > Dear Forest, > > you wrote (27 Sep 2002): > > A "Condorcet Flavored PR Method" is an M-winner election method that > > (1) compares candidate subsets of cardinality M head-to-head, and > > (2) does the comparison in such a way that the winning combination > > of any head-to-head comparison provides better PR representation > > than the loser subset, and > > (3) gives the win to the "beats-all" combination if there is such > > a subset. > > Tideman has proposed such an election method: > > T. Nicolaus Tideman, Daniel Richardson, > "Better Voting Methods Through Technology: The > Refinement-Manageability Trade-Off in the Single > Transferable Vote," PUBLIC CHOICE, vol. 103, > p. 13-34, 2000 (http://www.econ.vt.edu/tideman/rmt.pdf) > I doubt that CPO-STV consistently gives the winning outcome "better PR representation" than the losing outcomes. It only transfers votes when at least one candidate is common to both outcomes. Since it is the transfer that makes it PR and since the proportion of outcome pairs that have common candidates decreases as the number of candidates increases relative to the number of winners, it seems to me that CPO=STV is semi- or quasi-PR.
Another way to compare outcomes is to count all pairwise candidate winning votes between the two outcomes, substituting approval count for winning votes when the two candidates being compared are the same candidate thus favoring those outcomes with candidates that have high approval counts. ---- For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc), please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
