Mike, you have a way of twisting reality... I do not remember who was supporting me, maybe Mr Gilmour. If I remember well, an honest summary was more like:
It seems two different understanding of 1p1v exist. Some people think that an equal opportunity for each voter is a valid definition of 1p1v. Approval for example respects this definition. It provides different voting power between ballots but equal opportunity. I do agree about finding approval "fair" between voters. But as I said before, there is more to 1p1v than only fairness from the voters point of view. Fairness has to be respected from the voted point of view too. In that sense, plurality could be seen as non-respecting 1p1v when multiple clones come to share the same votes. In the same way, I have already explained why I consider Approval not passing the same test. Approval solves the splitting-vote issue but it cannot map a bijection between electors and candidates. So, even if approval is fair to voters, it is unfair to some candidates (namely the extreme ones, extremeties being defined according to the small number of alternative preferences, not according to ideology). Maybe the "1person-1vote" name is not what you would like because it does not correspond to the criteria I just explained. "Reciprocial fairness" might best fit. I do not care about the name, except if a lot of people see 1p1v as I do. If I remember well, some people did see things as I do. Steph. PS: I had mail problems, this is why I lost some of our arguments. If I remember well you did not answer neither: -the example where approval lost a Condorcet winner. -my proof attempt that margin and relative margin pass an extended Ideal Democratic Winner protection from truncation criteria. -the philosophical point about an extremist governement as an attempt would benefit more to society than immuability caused by an always consensual method as approval.Of course this is a matter of proportion, but the electoral method should not maintain forever the statu quo according to me. Sometime any extremity would be better than the consensus. Some methods deny this by construction. If you prefer to discuss with Donald and Craig, it is your prerogative. MIKE OSSIPOFF a écrit : > Some time ago, two people on this list were advocating the use > of 1-person-1-vote as a criterion for judging methods. > > I pointed out to them that 1p1v is a rules criterion, rather than > a behavioral criterion. It simply says what someone believes a > method's rules should be like. > > I pointed out that EM members surely wouldn't accept a rules criterion > as a fundamental standard. > > I asked if the proponents of 1p1v consider it a fundamental standard, > a derived standard, or just a criterion, either of which need > justification in terms of a fundamental standard. > > I then asked those 2 people if they could justify 1p1v in terms > of a fundamental standard. > > Their failure to do so, after all this time, is their way of telling > us that they can't justify 1p1v in terms of a fundamental standard, > and that 1p1v apparently has no justification. > > Mike Ossipoff > > _________________________________________________________________ > MSN 8 helps eliminate e-mail viruses. Get 2 months FREE* > http://join.msn.com/?page=features/virus > > ---- > For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc), > please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em ---- For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc), please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
