Steph wrote:
Mike, you have a way of twisting reality...
Oh? Did I or did I not ask you & James if you could justify 1p1v
in terms of something more fundamental? Was that or was it not quite
a while ago? Did you do so during that time?
Steph continued:
I do not remember who was supporting me,
maybe Mr Gilmour.
If I remember well, an honest summary
was more like:
It seems two different understanding of 1p1v exist.
Some people think that an equal opportunity
for each voter is a valid definition of 1p1v.
I reply:
1 person 1 equally-counted ballot is what it's always meant.
It happens that those ballots are Plurality ballots, currently,
in a number of countries including this one.
But anyone can define something how they like, and of course that's
valid too.
Steph continued:
Approval for example respects this definition.
It provides different voting power between ballots
but equal opportunity.
I do agree about finding approval "fair" between
voters. But as I said before, there is more to
1p1v than only fairness from the voters point of view.
Fairness has to be respected from the voted point of view too.
In that sense, plurality could be seen as non-respecting 1p1v
when multiple clones come to share the same votes.
In the same way, I have already explained why
I consider Approval not passing the same test.
Approval solves the splitting-vote issue but it cannot
map a bijection between electors and candidates.
So, even if approval is fair to voters, it is unfair to
some candidates (namely the extreme ones, extremeties
being defined according to the small number of alternative
preferences, not according to ideology).
Maybe the "1person-1vote" name is not what you would like
because it does not correspond to the criteria I just explained.
"Reciprocial fairness" might best fit. I do not care about the name,
except if a lot of people see 1p1v as I do. If I remember well,
some people did see things as I do.
I reply:
Name it what you want, but state it more precisely than you have.
Tell exactly what 1p1v or Reciprocal Fairness requires, and why
it should be accepted as a fundamental standard. Or justify it in
terms of a fundamental standard. That was what I asked you do do a
long time ago, and what you still haven't done.
Steph continued:
PS: I had mail problems, this is why I lost some of
our arguments. If I remember well you did not answer neither:
I reply:
The mail problem that you had might have prevented your CW
example from posting. I answered your argument about the desirability
of electing extremists in violation of majority rule. I'll answer
it again, maybe today, maybe on a subsequent day. The mail problem
that you had might have kept you from receiving my reply, but it's
in the archives. Either I'll post the message number, or will
repeat my reply.
Steph continued:
-the example where approval lost a Condorcet winner.
Would you tell me the message number of that posting in which
you posted that example, or else re-post it? You know, no one claims
that Approval meets the Condorcet Criterion. Approval fails CC as I
define CC. As some others define CC, they simply say "Don't apply CC
to Approval or Plurality [because if you did, they'd pass CC]."
But, in any case, it's well established and universally accepted that
Approval isn't a Condorcet Criterion method.
Steph continued:
-my proof attempt that margin and relative margin pass
an extended Ideal Democratic Winner protection from truncation criteria.
I reply:
I replied to that. You'd posted a significantly weakened version
of SFC, and said that relative margins passes it. wv of course passes
the stronger original SFC & GSFC.
Protection from truncation isn't such a useful approach to a criterion,
since, for instance, Plurality & IRV don't even have offensive truncation strategy. But Plurality & IRV fail SFC & GSFC, as do
the versions of Condorcet that measured defeat strength by margins
or relative margins.
Steph continued:
-the philosophical point about an extremist governement as an attempt
would benefit more to society than immuability caused by an always
consensual method as approval.
I reply:
Excuse me? Approval causes immutability? If you want to vote someone
out, then don't vote for him, and vote for someone better.
As I've often said here, Approval quickly homes in on the voter median,
and stays there. Maybe that's what you mean by immutability, but it's
a misuse of the term, because the voters could change it if they wanted
to. But the voter median candidate, when compared separately to any
other candidate, is preferred to him by more people than vice-versa.
Steph continued:
Of course this is a matter of proportion,
but the electoral method should not maintain forever the statu quo according
to me.
I reply:
Do you mean that the electoral method shouldn't maintain a status quo
chosen by Steph, or that, according to you, the electoral system
shouldn't maintain the status quo? Even when leaving a particular
status quo involves a big violation of majority rule?
Steph continued:
Sometime any extremity would be better than the consensus.
I reply:
Better according to whom? Not better according to the majority whose
expressed wishes you'd violate in otder to go to the extreme.
Some methods deny this by construction.
I reply:
Good.
Even if you hate the middle, you should still prefer methods that
honor majority rule. That's because if the voting system doesn't
protect the voter median candidate, then voters will do whatever it
takes to do so themselves. For instance, in Plurality, IRV, margins
and relative margins, they'll often do so by the defensive strategy
of burying their favorite.
Steph continued:
If you prefer to discuss with Donald and Craig, it is your prerogative.
I reply:
Should that be taken as a call for assistance from Don & Craig?
Anyway, I've never evaded discussing these issues with you.
MIKE OSSIPOFF a écrit :
Some time ago, two people on this list were advocating the use of 1-person-1-vote as a criterion for judging methods.I pointed out to them that 1p1v is a rules criterion, rather than a behavioral criterion. It simply says what someone believes a method's rules should be like. I pointed out that EM members surely wouldn't accept a rules criterion as a fundamental standard. I asked if the proponents of 1p1v consider it a fundamental standard, a derived standard, or just a criterion, either of which need justification in terms of a fundamental standard. I then asked those 2 people if they could justify 1p1v in terms of a fundamental standard. Their failure to do so, after all this time, is their way of telling us that they can't justify 1p1v in terms of a fundamental standard, and that 1p1v apparently has no justification. Mike Ossipoff
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