Adam Tarr wrote: > > So, by my reckoning, every commonly discussed single-winner election method > passes 1p1v, although Borda sort of teeters on the edge, and Condorcet > doesn't really fit rules of 1p1v at all. Well, that's the best I can do, > and I don't think it's particularly meaningful or applicable. Can anyone > do better?
I doubt that I can do better, but I agree that the very concept of 1p1v depends entirely on how you define a "vote". If a vote is an indivisable entity, then 1p1v is pretty much the definition of plurality voting, and only plurality voting meets the criterion. If you allow the voter to cast fractional votes, then I'm don't know what system fails 1p1v. Obviously this allows cumulative voting, but then why not others: Approval Voting: Each voter's vote is divided into n fractions of value 1/n, where n is the number of candidates. The voter is allowed to cast one and only one fractional vote per candidate. This fractional vote can be cast as either "for" or "against". Runoff or IRV: Each voter has r fractional votes, equal to 1/r whole votes, where r is the number of rounds required (I think the most fair-sounding definition for these methods is that each voter votes exactly once per round, thus each voter votes r times-- the "traveling vote" explanation would only make sense if any effect of the vote in its prior position is reversed before the vote is allowed to "travel". Condorcet: Each voter has n(n-1)/2 fractional votes, of which one and only one shall be cast for each pair of candidates. Bart ---- For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc), please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em