As an example, > >perhaps Pat Buchanan could accidentally win. Most > >people know something about him, but I bet quite a > few > >Gore supporters would rank Buchanan above Bush, > >thinking it a possible weapon against Bush, without > >any risk of electing the former. > > I don't think we can safely make any such > assumptions, and I think we should keep our contest > examples apolitical and anonymous (candidate A, B).
Alright, I'll keep that in mind, but I thought it would be relatively uncontroversial to imply that Buchanan shouldn't be the winner, given the people voting rather than his positions. I do think the safer route would be to make worst-case assumptions as I am. Although I'm not saying I wouldn't vote for Condorcet if it were an option. > > >This requires a simultaneous approval and ranked > >ballot, right? Wouldn't it be a better system at > >least to find the Condorcet winner among candidates > >meeting a defined Approval threshold? My > motivation > >for mixing Condorcet and Approval would be to > protect > >against the former's possible flukes. > > It requires a ranked ballot with a voter specified > approval cutoff. How would a practical and > non-arbitrary Approval threshold be pre-declared? > Would it be set based on number of candidates? > Number of voters? Neither? The threshold would have to be arbitrary, but there are a lot of arbitrary things that society can reach a consensus on, and alter on occasion. I would say that the "majority" criterion in other systems (plurality w/ run-off, IRV, Majority Choice Approval) is a shade arbitrary. It's intuitive in that the majority could beat everyone else in a fist-fight, but outside of that the only intuitive thing is if the winner also has the most "votes" defined in some way. (I say this only as food for thought. The very systemic features of an electoral method could be called arbitrary.) The threshold shouldn't be based on number of candidates; I think that would invite clone problems. It should be based on percentage of voters. Wouldn't people generally agree on a figure such as 20%? Would we want a winner with less than 20% approval? A failing candidate merely would not be eligible for victory. It wouldn't be a complete loss for him, I don't think, because Condorcet can use information from "irrelevant alternatives." (...Maybe? I'd have to think about it. The question is whether the rankings of a non-winning candidate can alter who the winner is, particularly if this candidate *is* the proper CW.) Thanks for your response. Stepjak ___________________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? -- Une adresse @yahoo.fr gratuite et en français ! Yahoo! Mail : http://fr.mail.yahoo.com ---- For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc), please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
