Kevin, You are right, I erred. MDD,ER-Bucklin(Whole) doesn't meet Smith(Gross), so scrub that and replace it with "Condorcet(Gross)".
Douglas Woodall gives this demonstration: 49: a>b>c>d>i>j>k>e>f>g>h 31: e>f>g>h>j>k>i>a>b>c>d 20: k>i>j>a>b>c>d>e>f>g>h >The Smith set is {i,j,k} (beating a,b,c,d by 51 to 49 and e,f,g,h by >69 to 31). But i beats j by 69 to 31, j beats k by 80 to 20, and k >beats i by 51 to 49, so that every candidate has a majority-strength >defeat. Thus the MDD bit has no effect, and the method reduces to >Bucklin. No candidate has a majority in the top three preferences, >and if the top four preferences are counted then A wins. But A is >not in the Smith set. > I don't consider this to be a serious drawback, and I don't doubt that you are right that compliance with any sort of top-cycle criterion is incompatible with FBC. Chris Benham ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info