Mike Ossipoff wrote: >The criteria SFC and SDSC describe why complying methods don't have a >problem with those offensive strategies.
Chris Benham wrote: >46: A>B >44: B>C (sincere is B or B>A) >10: C >The defeat-dropper style "Condorcet(wv)" method you refer to here >elects B. >This looks a lot like vulnerability to "offensive order-reversal" (aka >Burial strategy) to me. Mike Ossipoff has long ago come to the conclusion that the vulnerability of WV methods to the burying strategy is not worth worrying about. He reaches this conclusion based on several assumptions (some stated and some unstated) about strategic voting behavior. There are plenty of people who believe that that the vulnerability of WV Condorcet to the burying strategy *is* severe enough to be worth worrying about. There are also some people who haven't made up their minds one way or the other about whether the vulnerability is severe enough. I belong to this last category. In my opinion, it is very hard to draw definite conclusions about strategic behavior in methods that are rarely or never used for high-stakes elections, because voter strategy as a phenomenon is very complex, probably too complex to model definitively. Thus, I prefer to make more tentative statements about strategy in methods that are largely untried in high-stakes scenarios. When a strategic flaw is very obvious in theory (e.g. as in the Borda count or margins Condorcet), I am happy to reject the method out of hand, but when theoretical strategic vulnerability is closer to the margin (as in WV Condorcet), I prefer to reserve judgement. We've been through all this several times before. At the moment, I have nothing new to say on the topic. my best, James ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info