Yes to Chris Benham; I independently came up with a very similar IRV FAVS-violation example and posted it on http://groups.yahoo.com/group/RangeVoting/message/2716 http://groups.yahoo.com/group/RangeVoting/message/2708
To Scott Ritchie, yes, I just invented the name FAVS and IFAVS (incomplete info version). Perhaps FAVA is better name than FAVS. N.Tideman told me, however, that he does not consider FAVS-satisfaction necessarily to be a good thing. In fact, he thinks it is probably a bad thing. Anyway, CONTINUUM range voting (which is what I generally mean when I say "range voting" in a mathematical context) satisfies IFAVS but IRV and Borda fail FAVS and fail IFAVS; approval and plurality satisfy FAVS but fail IFAVS. I do not know of any method other than range voting that satisfies IFAVS, but wouldn't be surprised if some other continuum voting method also would. Oho: L2-ball voting will too. (Your vote in N-candidate election is a real N-vector with sum of squares <=1.) So will cumulative (ditto, but each entry is >=0 and sum of entries is <=1). Both L2-ball and cumulative voting are stupid voting systems however because best strategy is always to plurality vote in a complete-info situation anyhow, as well as all the most common incomplete-info situations, for cumulative, and for L2 you vote (+1, -1, 0,0,...,0) / sqrt(2) for the two frontrunners. Reducing to vote-for-and-against. wds http://rangevoting.org ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info