Response to Schudy re Range vs Approval voting >W.Schudy: >Summary: I believe it's better to force everyone to vote strategically >(approval) than to give power to the candidate whose supporters >have the most black and white, polarized view of the world.
--WDS replies: This criticism of range voting has been heard several times before, but Schudy perhaps has a nicer way to phrase and view it than the previous critics, which makes his attack overcome more of range voting's defenses. (For some of those defenses, see, e.g. http://rangevoting.org/StratHonMix.html http://rangevoting.org/ShExpRes.html .) *1. with range voting, it is "recommended" (this could be, by law, printed on ballots) but not "required" that voters rate their favorite with the top score (say 99 for 0-99 range) and their most-hated with the least score (0). With such a recommendation, it is likely that almost all range voters will actually do that. If range voters max and min the two perceived-frontrunner candidates, then they gain almost all the strategic advantages of approval voting, while still allowing quite a lot of honesty concerning other candidates. *2. So for example, if 49% voted Bush=99, Gore=0, Nader=53(avg), and 49% voted Gore=99, Bush=0, Nader=53(avg), and 2% voted Nader=99, Gore=20, Bush=0 then Nader would win. This structure is a realistic possibility that totally contradicts the assertion RV "gives power to the candidate whose supporters have the most black and white, polarized view of the world." In this case, Nader is winning despite a severe lack of polarized Nader supporters. (See also http://rangevoting.org/TidemanRespB.html .) Indeed by forcing voters to vote approval-style, you would *force* artificial "polarization" and thus distort the results by causing Nader to have an artificially high or low score (probably the latter; it depends on the shape of the distribution whose average was 53). This is totally contrary to Schudy's claimed desire. *3. If we also add, say, Badnarik with scores not of 53 like for Nader, but rather, say, 20, then Badnarik would not win, but still would get a total range-voting score in the same ballpark as Bush, Gore, and Nader, thus permitting him to claim he has a lot of popular support, and thus allowing his party to try to get money and support for future elections. *4. However, if forced to vote approval-style, the latter possibility is precluded, causing Badnarik and his party forever to get very low scores (below 1%) and never be able to attract either money or serious candidates. As a result, the country would have fewer choices since small parties would be artificially prevented from growing to a deservedly-large size and strength. That's very bad. Furthermore, with continued 2-party domination, "polarization" is kind of inherent! Thus Schudy, by supporting approval over range, in fact could be CAUSING huge polarization, FORCING all Nader-like candidates to lose, and fossilizing it forever, preventing third parties from ever becoming significant - exactly the opposite of what Schudy says he wants! Note, it was an "immediate" bad effect that (above) Approval caused Nader to lose when Range vould have caused him to win. But what we here are talking about is a "secondary" - not-immediate but rather prolonged over historical time - effect somewhat resembling "Duverger's law" that certain voting systems engender 2-party domination. *5. That scenario (the "nursery effect" http://rangevoting.org/NurseryEffect.html ) is quite plausible. See http://rangevoting.org/PsEl04.html to see that Badnarik indeed got hugely less with approval than with range voting. This is a systematic effect that hurts all third-party candidates with approval, and hurts them hugely. *6. We have to base our arguments on reality. In our study of the 2004 US election, we were not able to find any evidence that Bush voters were either more or less "polarized" and "strategically exaggerating" than Gore voters. (Perhaps they were, but if so the effect was too small for our statistics to see.) This is only one election of course, so it does not mean a lot, but still, the fact is, Schudy apparently has no evidence that any nonuniform polarization ever exists, and what little evidence we do have, suggests it does not. The point is, it is hard to make such a conspiracy work. You have to get your suppoters to all agree to be strategic, AND keep this conspiracy secret so the other side does not find out about it and try to compensate. Realistic? Or a fantasy? *7. Might it be somebody could have a legitimate reason to score some preferences more strongly than others, and this is not because they are "polarized"? *8. Another interesting and good - kind of more philosophical - response to this kind of criticism, is by Lomax: http://rangevoting.org/TidemanRespA.html . Warren D. Smith http://rangevoting.org ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info