Here are some remaining comments and responses to the questions. No new material, just confirming the presented viewpoints.
On Aug 11, 2007, at 4:37 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: > At 05:03 PM 8/10/2007, Juho wrote: >> In the light of this example it doesn't matter how the "sincere" >> votes are derived or where they come from. Any method and logic is >> ok. It could be based on terms "sincere" and "utilities", or not. The >> only criterion is technical by nature, i.e. that the voter uses the >> values in some other way than using mostly min and max values. > > In other words, even if your vote of max for one and min for > another, and no intermediate values for anyone (maybe they are also > max or min, or you left them blank) is an accurate reflection of > your preferences, i.e., it is sincere, then your vote is "strategic." I don't want to define/redefine "strategic". The technical properties of the votes are enough. I wrote: >> Range could ignore also a clear majority >> opinion. I should have written "a clear majority and utility opinion as a result of strategic voting". > > One could e.g. translate utility values 1 > >A=90, B=80 and 1 B=90, A=70 to actual votes 1 A=100, B=0 and 1 B=90, > >A=70. > > So this is two voters. Thus it is 50-50 as far as first preference > is concerned. (And we can imagine that this is two whole sets of > voters voting identically.) Fine. If I'm correct, Juho is asserting > that, if the votes are translated as stated, the outcome is "bad." > > Yet what method is going to do better than Range in this example? Range changes the winner depending on the level of strategic voting. Most other methods would give a tie. --------------------------- On Aug 11, 2007, at 5:50 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: >> > D R1 R2 >> > 50: 100 80 70 >> > 30: 70 100 90 >> > 20: 0 0 100 >> > --------------------- >> > 7100 7000 8200 > In any case, what is "bad" about this scenario? The success of the strategic voters. >> They were intended to be strategic/exaggerating republicans whose >> sincere opinion could have been e.g. R2=100, R1=90, D=70. > These are not normalized utilities, on what basis are they made > commensurable? The problems rose from some voters normalizing or exaggerating and some not. > So on what basis does Juho assume utilities as he did. Why is the > worst candidate in the set a "70"? > > He is postulating circumstances that are unreal. Any reasons and votes that give other than min and max values will do. > A major contradiction in Juho's argument is that he assumes that > voters would vote a weak vote in Range but that they would > accurately predict which form of Approval vote would serve them > best, and they would not vote a weak vote in Approval. I don't want to claim anything about Approval or Approval like strategies. > If the Ds considered R2 a poor choice, why did they rate him at 70? > *That is a high rating.* They didn't consider R2 to be a poor choice (although R2 was to them the worst choice). > Who would be a better winner? R1 and D based on social utilities (and according to the choices of many methods). Juho ___________________________________________________________ The all-new Yahoo! Mail goes wherever you go - free your email address from your Internet provider. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info