Diego, --- Diego Santos <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > Suppose this scenario: > > 46: A >> B > C > 5: B >> A > C > 5: B >> C > A > 44: C >> B > A > > B beats A and C, but he is approved for only 10% of the voters.
In my opinion, if B is able to get fully 100% of the voters to give him a ranking, then B is exactly the candidate for whose benefit I want to change election methods. B is a better representative of the "middle" voter. > A possible patch is to avoid rank-only ballots and ignore candidates with > less than 1/2 approval (or total score, if range ballots are used) of the > most approved candidate. This simple rule also solves DH3 pathology. This only seems reliable if you assume that approval will be voted sincerely. I have a method called MAMPO which elects the most approved candidate unless more than one has majority approval, in which case of the majority-approved candidates the one with the lowest MMPO score is elected. This method has an advantage in that it never rewards favorite betrayal. Since I don't consider voted approval to be a reliable indicator of anything (at least, it means no more to me than an explicit vote of any kind), I would say that if you're concerned about "everyone's second choice" winning without any strong support, perhaps you could use IRV or top-two runoff. Kevin Venzke _____________________________________________________________________________ Ne gardez plus qu'une seule adresse mail ! Copiez vos mails vers Yahoo! Mail http://mail.yahoo.fr ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info