Jonathan, --- Jonathan Lundell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > ...should choose B as a good compromise, with the A voters saying A is > good, B OK, C very bad. But Diego's profile suggests to me that the A > voters are saying something like A is good, B is bad, C is very bad. > Not that they can express it in a normal linear ballot, just that > we're being told a little more about their opinions.
In my opinion, to the extent that the effect of a ">>bad>verybad" vote is disregarded, the point of letting voters indicate such preferences is undermined anyway. > In my example, the effect of a later-no-harm voting rule is evident. > In Diego's, a rule (such as STV) that elects A doesn't seem > unreasonable to me. > > The problem is that with an ordinary linear ballot (no '>>'), we can't > distinguish between the cases. Not that I'm arguing that we should > employ '>>'; offhand, that strikes me as a complication to be avoided. In one sense I don't agree. If >> is allowed then apparently it's safe to vote ">>bad>verybad." If >> isn't allowed then voters will probably be more cautious, since the method could very well take them as serious if they say that bad is better than verybad. I tend to think that if B doesn't win in Diego's scenario, the method is second-guessing the voters. It either disbelieves the C voters' preference for B over A, or finds that there's something more important than majority rule. Kevin Venzke _____________________________________________________________________________ Ne gardez plus qu'une seule adresse mail ! Copiez vos mails vers Yahoo! Mail http://mail.yahoo.fr ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info