Stephane,
I have some difficulty understanding your method. It looks like you
repeatedly find the RP(wv) ranking and assign the last-ranked candidate a
score based on approval (in a way that I didn't totally understand). Then
you disregard this candidate when redetermining the ranking. So that
somehow, which candidates are still being considered in the ranking affects
your approval-based score. If this is basically right then I'd guess the
method is at least not monotonic.
What is your answer to Chris' question about the resolution of this
scenario? :
> 49: A | > C
> 48: B | > C
> 03: C | > B
He thinks your method elects A. While I can understand why this kind of
method could elect A, it seems alarming to me that it collects the
"disapproved" rankings, which not only seem unused, but also draw attention
to the method's failure of criteria. I imagine it would undermine the
perceived legitimacy of the winner.
Kevin Venzke
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