Hi Diego, --- Diego Santos <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > Definition: "Some candidate X is a potential winner if, for all Y that > beats > X, the margin of Y against X is lesser than the greatest margin of > another > candidate against Y". The winner is the Condorcet winner among potential > winners". > > This method meets mono-add-top and I think also Smith, because always > Minimax(margins) and Smith//Minimax(margins) winners are potential, > although > Markus said that no known method passes both criteria
Am I correct that in the following scenario: 49 A 24 B 27 C>B Your method selects A and B as "potential winners" and elects B? Specifically: A's loss to B is weaker than B's loss to C. B's loss to C is weaker than C's loss to A. Only C's loss to A is stronger than A's loss to B. Then, the CW between A and B is B. B is not a potential winner of either Minmax(margins) or Smith//Minmax(margins). Mono-add-top is a very difficult criterion to satisfy if the method only regards pairwise contests. When you add an A>B>C>D ballot there is no record in the matrix that the top preference on this ballot was A. You need a way to ensure that if A wins, A remains the winner no matter what other information is on the new ballot. I can barely think how to do this, let alone how to do it when Smith compliance is also needed. Kevin Venzke _____________________________________________________________________________ Ne gardez plus qu'une seule adresse mail ! Copiez vos mails vers Yahoo! Mail http://mail.yahoo.fr ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info