Again, why NOT Condorcet?
Its' ballot is ranking, essentially the same as IRV, except the directions
better be more intelligent:
Rank as many as you choose - ranking all is acceptable IF you choose.
Rank as few as you choose - bullet voting is acceptable if that
completes a voter's desired expression.
Equal ranking permitted.
Condorcet usually awards the same winner as IRV. Major differences:
Condorcet looks at ALL that the voters rank, while IRV ignores parts.
Condorcet recognizes near ties, and tries to respond accordingly.
Could be a debate about the near ties - would it be better to resolve such
with a runoff? Runoffs take time and are expensive. Are they enough
better than what Condorcet can do with the original vote counts?
DWK
On Fri, 11 Jul 2008 22:11:38 +0000 (GMT) [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Forest Simmons wrote (Sun Jul 6 16:36:32 PDT 2008 ): > There is a lot of momentum behind IRV.? If we cannot stop it,
are there some tweaks that would make it more liveable?
Someone has suggested that a candidate withdrawal option would
go a long way towards ameliorating the damage.
Here's another suggestion, inspired by what we have learned from
Australia's worst problems with their version of IRV:
Since IRV satisfies Later No Harm, why not complete the
incompletely ranked ballots with the help of the rankings of the
ballot's favorite candidate?
The unranked candidates would be ranked below the ranked
candidates in the order of the ballot of the favorite.
If the candidates were allowed to specify their rankings after
they got the partial results, this might be a valuable improvement.
Forest
Chris Benham replied:
Forest,
To me in principle voter's votes being commandeered by
candidates isn't justified.
Commandeered?
The voter ranks all she wants to and the remaining candidates are ranked (later, i.e. below) by the voter's
favorite or perhaps, as Steve Eppley has suggested, by the voter's specified public ranking.
Since IRV satisfies LNH, what's the harm in this?
In Australia, where (in single winner elections) most of the voters copy candidate cards, this would save
them a lot of bother.
This particular horrible idea would create a strong incentive
for the major power-brokers
to sponsor the nomination of a lot of fake candidates just to
collect votes for one or other
of the major parties.
Am I mising something here? I thought IRV was clone free.
How do you think it "might be a valuable improvement"?? What
scenario do you have in
mind?
(Besides the aboved mentioned advantage):
In conjunction with the candidate withdrawal option, it might enable the (other) losing candidates to save the
Condorcet candidate, or otherwise compensate for IRV's non-monotonicity.
And what do you have in mind as? "Australia's worst problems
with their version of IRV"?
It has degenerated into a defacto second rate version of Asset Voting.
Why do you want to "stop" IRV? Do you agree with Kathy Dopp?
that? IRV is worse than
FPP?
I would stop IRV if we could get a better method in its place.
If we cannot stop IRV, why not search for acceptable tweaks that would improve
it?
It is better than FPP in some ways and worse in others, especially in
complexity.
Do you think that Asset Voting is worse than FPP?
Just to clarify, I think that Condorcet Methods and Range, though better than IRV, share this complexity
defect with IRV to some degree. I have suggested the same tweak for them.
In fact, that is the essence of DYN, wihich is simply carrying this tweak to its logical conclusion in the case
of Range, which is the only one of the three (Range, Condorcet, and IRV) that satisfies the FBC.
This tweak works best for Range, because (in the case of Range) the ballot that accomodate this tweak is
of the extremely simple "Yes/No/Favorite" style. The Favorite category could easily be augmented to
include Eppley's "Published Ballots" idea.
Forest
--
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Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.
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