Juho wrote (in thread PRfavoringracialminorities):
Possible interest to have stable governments that live from one
(traditional) election to the next may be seen as a factor that talks
against continuous elections. On the other hand also governments
could be
flexible. They could include new parties in the government if the
support
of the old government parties gets too small.
I just posted a question along these lines, in APSA_ITP. I wasn't
concerned that power structures would be de-stabilized by continuous
elections, at least not in mid-term - I argue to the contrary. But my
question concerned the dynamics of power shifts that occur *between*
terms. Here's a copy of the post, in case anyone else is interested
in the question.
===== quote, with a minor corrections, from =====
http://lists.hmdc.harvard.edu/lists/
apsa_itp_at_lists_hmdc_harvard_edu/2008_08/msg00011.html
I have a question on my mind. It has to do with the possibility of
independent elections in the public sphere. May I throw the question
open to the list? It arises from this little story (refs at bottom):
The young people in a certain neighbourhood wish to make
improvements to their playground or park. They come up with a plan
and begin to promote it locally. Some of them are in disagreement
and propose alternative plans. They all share access to a new kind
of electoral medium. They use the medium to highlight their
differences and to resolve them one by one. Eventually they reach
a general agreement on a consensus plan. The City sends a safety
inspector to the site, and trucks in some sand. With a little
help, the young people complete the improvements to the park.
Just so, that's the complete outline. I'll introduce a few other
characters in a moment. They have an important role to play behind
the scenes. Their role is not only to decide on plans and policies
(norms), but also on candidates for office (power). The same
electoral medium is used for both decision types. But it's the latter
type I have a question about. It relates to this tree-like structure
of voting (to see it, you will need a fixed-width font):
(I) (K) (L)
\ 1 | 1 /
\ | / 1 (A) (B)
(P) (O) \ | / | 1 /
(R) \ 1 | \|/ | / 1
\ 1 \ | 1 (M) | /
\ \ | | | / (E) (F)
\ \| | 4 |/ | 1 /
1 \ (Q) | (C) | / 1
(S)-----(T) \ 3 | | | /
\ 3 \ | | 3 |/
\ \ | | (H)-----(G)
\ \ | (D) | / 1
1 2 \ \| \ 1 | /
(U)-----(V)-----(W) (N) \ | / 4
\ 6 / \ | /
\ / 8 \|/
\ / (J)
\ /
(X) 8
---
14
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FIG 1. Delegate cascade voting. A snapshot of a small election in
which two separate cascades have formed. Vote flow is depicted by
lines (downward), and volume by numbers. The votes flow together
until they pool at the bottom, where they are held by the leading
candidates.
PNG image: http://zelea.com/project/votorola/d/_/cascade.png
This is a snapshot image, it covers only a single moment in time. The
actual election is continuous, never ending, and the votes are free to
shift. So M (center top) may shift her vote to C. And 'I' may
respond by shifting hers to Q. And so on... The structure of the tree
is dynamic, not fixed. It models the structure of *opinion*, and will
therefore fluctuate as people change their minds.
A tree can model other social structures, aside from public opinion.
Flip it upside down, and it takes on the appearance of an organization
chart. That could be the Mayor at bottom (X), and her two lieutenants
(W and N). In this view, the tree is modelling the structure of
*power*. These two views will come together, as the story continues.
Mae is a community leader in the neighbourhood. She is also a
local delegate in the public election for Mayor. When she learns
of the plans to improve the park she takes an interest.
Mae speaks to Hal. Hal is a local delegate in the election for
Public Health Officer. Mae asks Hal to look into the safety issues
of the proposed plan. Hal agrees. He takes a lead role in
drafting a set of safety amendments for the plan. His amendments
attract the votes of many parents in the neighbourhood. The votes
are numerous enough to ensure that safety concerns are going to
feature prominently in the plan.
The young planners have a question about the delivery of the sand,
so they approach Wen. Wen is a local building contractor and a
delegate for the Public Works Office. Wen explains that several
types of sand are available from the City yards. He says that
delivery will depend on budgetary approval. So they add "sand" to
the Budget section of their plan.
Later, when it appears that a consensus is likely to form, Mae
requests approval for the plan. She does not speak directly to
City Hall, rather she speaks to her own delegate - the person she
is voting for in the Mayoral election. In reply she receives a
signed email from the Comptroller of the Parks Department,
authorizing a preliminary safety inspection of the site. Mae
forwards the authorization to Hal, who arranges for the actual
inspection. When the safety inspector arrives, Hal guides her to
the site... And so on.
Recalling the tree images, we can clearly see a rationale for aligning
vote flow to the structure of power. Mae's vote has opened a
communication channel to City Hall. She uses that channel to
coordinate her *local* leadership with the resources and power of
*central* government. Her success in getting things done around the
neighbourhood attracts votes, which she uses in turn as leverage to
keep the channel open.
By the same token, we can understand how the distribution of power
from the center will align with the inward flow of votes. From the
Mayor's point of view, the electoral backing of the central delegates
(W and N) is a strong argument to back-delegate a share of power to
them. And so on - the imperative is recursive - the central delegates
too must back-delegate their power in line with their own electoral
support (following the rule of patronage, "you dance with them that
brought you").
The combined effect is one of mutual reinforcement: from both sides,
vote flow and power flow are going to crystallize into a single whole.
Its stability will defy internal tensions. Delegate M might not
*like* having X as Mayor, but she will think twice about shifting her
vote and losing her communication with City Hall. By the same token,
the Mayor might not *like* sharing power with her lieutenant N, but
she will think twice about dismissing her from office and losing her
votes.
Q. Given the stability of this combined structure, how will it
accommodate a power shift?
That's the question that has me puzzled. For example, suppose the
Mayor's term is coming to an end. An election day has been fixed for
some point in the future, and this impending fact begins to undermine
the attractions of the power structure. The glue starts to dissolve.
The delegates become free to shift their votes, and to seek a new
consensus. But how exactly will they do this?
(1). Will W, N and the other central delegates (not shown) confer
together, and reach an agreement amongst themselves, like Cardinals?
Presumeably they could then shift their votes in unison to the
consensus candidate. But what happens if they choose wrong? What if
their own backing melts away, as a consequence?
(2). If L dissents from the consensus, then she would find a ready
alternative in J. She might support J by shifting her vote to C.
Does this mean that a shadow power structure would have a role to play
as a lightning rod for dissent, and as a government in waiting? Might
that role become institutionalized as a kind of party system, one
party in power (X), and the other awaiting a turn (J)?
Can anyone see a third way for power to shift?
--
Michael Allan
Toronto, 647-436-4521
http://zelea.com/
The electoral medium is documented at:
http://zelea.com/project/votorola/home.xht
The scenario of park improvement was originally introduced and
discussed in the context of citizen vs. consumer relations, in these
threads:
http://groups.dowire.org/r/topic/2ma78lpfH1ZqdOZv2k7R6j
http://groups.dowire.org/r/topic/6VbcCacxpBG6tkOSrpIf9y
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