On Wed, 15 Oct 2008 18:49:41 +0200 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Raph Frank wrote:
On 10/9/08, Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
If there is a near tie among three or more, they often disagree but
usually get one of the leaders - matters little since the leaders
were about
equally deserving.
It matters because IRV reinforces the 2 party system.
it would be interesting to know what would be the effect of electing a
parliament by condorcet voting from single seat districts. It is
possible that it would also result in a 2 party system.
Since Condorcet is a majoritarian method (as it needs to be in order to
be a good single-winner method), the resulting parliament would also be
majoritarian. This means that a party whose candidates consistently got
low support in all districts would find none of those elected.
But Condorcet is also a better single-winner method than Plurality, so
the candidates would be better representatives of the majority. They
would probably be good compromise candidates, so the parliament would be
less party-based than one elected by PR methods.
This might not be all that good for traditional parliaments; I don't
know if the majoritarian nature would lessen competition (except in
dominant-party states, where using Condorcet would be an improvement on
Plurality in that respect), but it would reduce the voice of the minority.
I claim the arguments here as to 2 party domination are overdone - and
sometimes in a way to inspire undesirable resistance by those parties. I
would rather emphasize the positive aspects:
With Condorcet EVERY voter can vote preference between the two major
parties, no matter what the voter's primary interest may be.
With Condorcet EVERY voter can also express whatever interest may be felt
as to other candidates.
Note that these abilities do not conflict, though voters can emphasize
whichever they choose as most important to them.
With Condorcet's N*N arrays all candidates and their backers have a
recording of voter interests and can and should adjust based on what they
can learn of voter desires from the N*N reports as to pairs of candidates.
It might be a good choice for an upper house decided to be a moderating
counterweight to a populist lower house.
However, based on certain assumptions, IRV is 2 party reinforcing.
Also, Australia gives "experimental" evidence that IRV leads to a 2
party system.
How much of that is due to election method, and how much as to other
aspects of politics and elections?
Condorcet wouldn't necessarily, so that is a good reason to at least
try it.
It's possible that IRV is a bad single-winner method precisely because
STV is a good PR method (with many seats). In STV, one doesn't need to
find a candidate that covers a large area of opinion space, since other
candidates can be used to cover those areas, but in IRV there are no
other positions to be used in such a manner. I'm not sure if this is the
reason, but it would fit well with my simulation results that
"majoritarian IRV" (eliminate until only k remains for council size k)
is a surprisingly good PR method, at least in absence of strategy.
Of course simulations can help but, too often, they are affected by biases
of the simulator.
--
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Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.
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