The named methods get to me, so trying: Ala Schulze, find the innermost unbeaten set.
If all set members are true ties with each other, pick one via truly random selection. This will often result in a single winner, and should be doable from the N*N matrix by most voters (matrix BETTER be available to all interested). Else we have a cycle and room for debate in completing the rules among such as wv vs margins. Simplicity remains desirable. BTW - since the voters have better opportunity to express their desires than with such as Plurality, there is no need for such complications as runoffs. DWK On Sun, 2 Nov 2008 09:00:56 -0300 Diego Santos wrote: > > 2008/11/2 Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> > > Dave Ketchum wrote: > > A few thoughts: > Plurality or Approval cannot fill need. > IRV uses about the same ballot as Condorcet - but deserves > rejection for its method of counting. > Condorcet can - but I am trying to word this to also accept > other methods that satisfy need. > Range does much the same, but needs better words than I have > seen as to how, simply, to rate SoSo when ranking would be > Good>SoSo>Bad. > Method needs to be understandable by voters (I read > compaints about handling of Condorcet cycles - I claim that they > do not need to be ubderstood in detail - mostly that discussing > frequency and effect should satisfy most). > The methods that inspired this missive claim to offer some, > possible valuable, benefits - at a cost that may be prohibitive > - leave them to audiences who agree the benefits are worth the cost. > > > If Schulze's too complex, use MAM (Ranked Pairs) or River. These are > at least easy to explain. If people are very concerned about FBC, > then perhaps MDDA - though I don't know it does with respect to the > advanced criteria (like clone resistance). > > Schulze does have the advantage of wide use, at least compared to > the two other methods here. While I don't know if potential > legislators would lend any weight to its use in computer related > organizations, the others haven't much of a record at all. > > One other thing to note is that some multiwinner elections in New > Zealand uses Meek STV. Not exactly the simplest to understand of > methods, so it may still be possible to get complex methods through. > > The only criterion people are concerned is to find a majority winner. > This is the reason of the wide use of two-round system outside the USA > and the adoption of IRV in some local elections in this country. > Unfortunately, TRS and IRV winners are apparent majority winners, and > the true majority exists only for the Condorcet winner. > > Condorcet cycles are a problem. I think that sincere cycles would be > rare, but manipulation would bring to frequent cycles. > Condorcet//Approval is a simple cycle resolution method with stable > counterstragies to tactical voting, if explicit approval cutoffs are > used, or discourage burying if approval is implicit. There is no need to > explain beatpaths, winning votes, or defeat strength. > > -- > ________________________________ > Diego Renato dos Santos -- [EMAIL PROTECTED] people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
