Stephane, You are confusing the spoiler effect with monotonicity.
Plurality voting is ALWAYS monotonic. Neither IRV or plurality solve the spoiler problem. Both are susceptible to strategizing. I don't know any voting method that is not. Does anyone have anything helpful to add? Kathy On Thu, Nov 6, 2008 at 9:03 PM, Stéphane Rouillon <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Again Kathy, it depends how you define monotonicity. > > With FPTP, you can easily let your third choice win by voting for your first > choice > while you could have got your second choice elected by voting for him. > But as you only want to consider monotonicity in regard to your first > choice, you argue that FPTP is monotonic, which is right using that > definition. > > Stephane Rouillon > ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info