On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 4:05 PM, Juho Laatu <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > One could e.g. force supporters of the "eliminated" candidates to approve > more than one candidate (at least one of the "remaining" candidates) (instead > of just bullet voting their second preference). On possible way to terminate > the algorithm would be to stop when someone has reached >50% approval level. > > Also in "non-instant" runoffs one could e.g. force the voters to approve at > least one on the "remaining" candidates. (One could eliminate more than one > candidate at different rounds.)
That is kinda like Bucklin, though without the approval threshold changing in each round for all voters. The process could be 1) Each candidate is designated a strong candidate 2) Each ballot is considered to approve the highest ranked strong candidate and all candidates ranked higher. 3) If the most approved candidate has > 50%, then that candidate is elected. 4) Re-designated the least approved strong candidate a weak candidate and goto 2). It still suffers from centre squeeze effects, though. For example 45: A>B>C 9: B>A>C 46: C>B>A Round 1 A: 45 B: 9 C: 46 no winner, B designated 'weak' Round 2 A: 54 B: 9 C: 41 A wins. The method has potential strategic truncation incentives. If B voters bullet voted for B, the result would have been Round 2 A: 46 B: 9 C: 41 C designated 'weak' Round 3 A: 46 B: 55 C: 41 B wins Ofc, the other voters can use counter strategies. It might be worth adding a rule that if all candidates on a ballot are weak, the ballot counts as approving everyone. ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
