On Fri, 07 Nov 2008 09:58:30 +0100 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote:
With the EC it seems standard to do Plurality - a method with
weaknesses most of us in EM recognize.
Let's do a Constitutional amendment to move up.
I propose Condorcet. One advantage is that states could move up to
use it as soon as ready. States, and even districts within states,
could remain with Plurality until able to move up - with their votes
counted as if they did bullet voting with Condorcet. Approval voting
would be permitted the same way.
To clarify, the US would be a single district, while vote counts
could be published for states and other contained districts, as might
be useful.
I think an NPV-style gradual change would have a greater chance of
succeeding than would a constitutional amendment. The constitutional
amendment requires a supermajority, and would thus be blocked by the
very same small states that benefit from the current Electoral College.
An NPV style change MIGHT have a greater chance than an amendment but:
It would be incomplete.
Small states could resist for the same reason.
Note that small states could retain their advantage with an amendment -- as
I proposed. What might all states compromise on?
As for the system of such a compact, we've discussed that earlier. I
think the idea of basing it on a Condorcet matrix would be a good one.
That is, states produce their own Condorcet matrices, and then these are
weighted and added together to produce a national Condorcet matrix,
which is run through an agreed-upon Condorcet method.
How do we tolerate either weight or not weight without formal agreement
(amendment)?
If all states use Plurality, well, the results are as in Plurality. If
some use Condorcet, those have an advantage, and if some want to use
cardinal weighted pairwise, they can do so. Yet it's technically
possible to use any method that produces a social ordering (by
submitting, if there are n voters and the social ordering is A>B>C, the
Condorcet matrix corresponding to "n: A>B>C"). While imperfect, and
possibly worse than Plurality-to-Condorcet or simple Condorcet matrix
addition, the option would be there, and would be better than nothing.
Actually each state does only the first step of Condorcet - the NxN array:
If a state does Condorcet, that is exact.
If a state does Plurality, conversion as if voters did bullet voting
in Condorcet is exact.
If a state does something else, it has to be their responsibility to
produce the NxN array.
States have differing collections of candidates:
In theory, could demand there be a single national list. More
practical to permit present nomination process, in case states desire such.
Thus states should be required to prepare their NxN arrays in a
manner that permits exact merging with other NxN arrays, without having to
know what candidates may be in the other arrays.
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED] people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.
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