I think this method is Warren Smith's multiwinner "poorest first"asset voting with predefined lists.
2008/11/16 Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Hi Kristofer, > > That's just the multiwinner adaptation of IRV. >> > > I don't think so! The point is that the *candidates* provide the ranking > from which the vote transfers are determined. The idea is to keep it > maximally simple for the voters: they still vote for only one candidate. > > I now realize that it is also different from STV in an important respect: > there is no transfer of excess votes! > > What I want with this method is a maximally simple multi-winner method that > does not rely on lists but is focussed on individual candidates and that > makes sure that all large-enough minorities are represented. It is not > important that it results in proportionality, hence it needs no transfer of > excess votes. > > Perhaps this is actually a new method? If so, what would we call it? > > Jobst > > I don't think it has a > >> formal name, but here's how I've defined (naive) multiwinner adaptations >> in my simulations: >> >> Take single-winner method X. Produce a social ordering, then if there are >> k winners to be elected, pick the k highest ranked on the social ordering, >> and elect them. >> >> The social ordering of IRV is opposite of its elimination order: the one >> who's eliminated in the first round is ranked last, and so on. >> >> -- >> >> That is, unless "the next candidate on her list" is the next candidate on >> the *candidate*'s list, in which case it would be a sort of >> STV-Asset/Party-list hybrid. >> > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > -- ________________________________ Diego Renato dos Santos Mestrando em Ciência da Computação COPIN - UFCG
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