Chris Benham wrote:
Greg,
I've come to the strong view that truncation (e.g. bullet voting)
without order-reversal shouldn't really qualify as a (insincere)
"strategy".
I don't see any point or use in us trying to distinguish between:
truncation because the voter is sincerely ambivalent or has no
preference among the unranked candidates, truncation because
the voter's preferences among the unranked candidates are too
weak for her to be bothered recording, or truncation because the
voter fears being stung by later-harm or is deliberately concealing
a clear pairwise preference in a diabolical scheme to thwart the
election of a shining sincere Condorcet winner.
I agree that resistance to Burying is atractive and IRV's big selling
point versus Condorcet methods.
As we know, Smith,IRV is resistant to burial (hence my statement of "if
you're going to have IRV, have Smith,IRV", since you gain Condorcet
compliance). I also think Minmax-elimination is resistant to burial (at
least it elects the "right" candidate in your Mutual Dominant Quarter
example).
However, IRV is nonmonotonic. Is it possible to make a monotonic method
that's resistant to burial? Dominant Mutual Third resistance? Dominant
Mutual Quarter? It would give very unintuitive results, but might be
needed if most of the electorate go "on a burial spree". I know of no
method that actually has these properties, though; the method I called
"first preference Copeland" was shown to be nonmonotonic as well
(incidentally, by you:
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2007
-January/019135.html )
(FPC is the method that, for each candidate, its penalty is the sum of
the first preference votes of the ones that pairwise beat it. Whoever
has least penalty wins.)
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