Abd ul-Rahman Lomax > Sent: Wednesday, December 24, 2008 5:39 PM > The general legal opinion seems to be that it doesn't fail that > principle. It *looks* like the person has more than one vote, but, > when the smoke clears, you will see that only one of these votes was > actually effective. The voter has contributed no more than one vote > to the total that allowed the candidate to win. Consider the election > as a series of pairwise elections.
An appeal to effective" votes is sophistry. Bucklin is not a series of pair-wise elections and more than one of your votes is being counted when there is no first preference winner but only one of mine. > In a ranked method, generally, such as STV, the voter may possibly > vote in all pair-wise elections, except that with STV some of these > votes aren't counted. STV is not a series of pair-wise elections. In STV the voter indicates contingency choices. These contingency choices (successive later preferences) are considered only in the contingency that the voter's ONE vote has to be transferred. > With a Condorcet method, the votes all count. Yes, all the marked preferences will allow the voter's one vote to be used in as many pair-wise comparisons as the voter wishes to participate in. > Think of it as IRV with a different method of deciding whom to > eliminate. I have heard this suggested for IRV (and STV-PR), but such a method of deciding the next elimination would not comply with Later-No-Harm. James No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG - http://www.avg.com Version: 8.0.176 / Virus Database: 270.10.0/1863 - Release Date: 24/12/2008 11:49 ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
