--- On Wed, 8/4/09, Don & Cathy Hoffard <dchoff...@verizon.net> wrote:
> Thanks Peter for your comments > > >Suppose that by my estimation about the electorate is > about > > >400: Smith, Jones, Johnson > >300: Jones, Smith, Johnson > >600: Johnson, Jones, Smith > > Johnson loses regardless as to whether Smith or Jones is > eliminated > Normal IRV with no strategy: > Jones is eliminated in the first round and Smith wins in > the second round. > > IRV with a strategy, of 101 vote switch, from Johnson > voters to Jones > Smith is eliminated in the first round and Jones wins in > the second round. > The Johnson voters would have to except Jones as their > second best choice. Here's another way to describe this strategy. If there is a Condorcet winner that will be eliminated before the last round, then some of the IRV voters have an interest to compromise and vote for the Condorcet winner. This group is large enough to make the Condorcet winner win. This strategy is also quite free of risks. In the example above, if the Johnson supporters are certain that Johnson will not win, then they could all vote for Jones. If the last round will be between Jones and Smith, Jones will win anyway. Actually it may be a quite good strategy in IRV not to rank those favourite candidates that do not have a chance but to rank only those candidates that have a chance. This increases the probability that one's most favoured candidates with chances of winning the election are not eliminated too early (assuming that they might win if they could stay in the race until the end). Juho ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info