Think some more re Jobst Heitzig's "Reverse Llull" method, I think "strategy-free" is not the right phrase to describe it.
Why? Heitzig's recommended way to vote is totally strategic (!), i.e. heavily dependent on that voter's info about what all the other voters are doing. By that reasoning, any strategic vote in ANY voting method is "honest" provided the voter, when deciding on her strategic vote, is asked (e.g. by her PC) a number of questions about both her preferences and about her perceptions of the other voters, and she answers them all honestly in order to generate the strategic vote! Well, no. But what Heitzig really does accomplish, is: he has a voting method where voters, BY ACTING STRATEGICALLY, will elect the honest-voter Condorcet winner (when one exists). Now with ordinary approval and range voting, it is an already known theorem, see http://rangevoting.org/AppCW.html that voters, BY VOTING STRATEGICALLY, will always elect the honest-voter Condorcet winner (when one exists). It is assumed that they choose their strategic vote in a certain (realistic) manner, and they have enough information about the other voters to do so... in particular, they do not need to have perfect info about the other votes, they merely need to know enough to know who the Condorcet winner C, and who the approval-voting winner would be if it were not C, are. -- Warren D. Smith http://RangeVoting.org <-- add your endorsement (by clicking "endorse" as 1st step) and math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info