FPTP: For most elections this can handle the decision needed - though
get near a tie and suspicion pushes toward doing a runoff.
IRV: Does let voters do ranked voting, but we find plenty of reasons
to complain about how it counts the votes.
Condorcet: Lets voters do ranked voting for more than one, indicating
which they like best.
Matters often to let them express their desires more completely
when they wish - though they can often adequately express their
desires via bullet voting.
Matters MUCH, though rarely, to sort out more complex
decisions. It is for this ability that we need such as Condorcet.
It is for the last topic, where there may be a cycle and no CW, that
analyzing votes is more of a challenge.
The Llull method will find the CW if it exists. Else it will find a
cycle member. Deciding which takes a bit more looking at the N*N
array. We debate how to choose a winner, which I claim should only
consider cycle members (any cycle member would become CW if other
members were rejected).
Tactical voting? PROVIDED you know how all others will vote, you may
be able to influence results by responding based on what you know.
That results can be affected via such makes sense. That you can both
have the needed information and modify your vote as you plan is a
suspect dream - perhaps someone can do useful analysis as to frequency
of attainable useful results for such.
Dave Ketchum
On Nov 23, 2009, at 5:00 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
...
i dunno how to, other than take the raw ballot data of some
existing IRV
elections, but i would like to see how many of these municipal IRV
elections, that if the ballots were tabulated according to Condorcet
rules, that a cycle would occur.
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
...
I haven't run the data through my simulator yet, but it seems
cycles are
rare.
i have to confess that i am less worked up about what pathologies
would result from a Condorcet cycle than i am about what pathologies
result from FPTP or IRV (or Borda or whoever) failing to elect the
Condorcet winner whether such exists. we know the latter actually
happens in governmental elections. i still have my doubts to any
significant prevalence of the former.
on the rare occasion a cycle ever happens, probably Tideman Ranked-
Pairs would be the best compromise between a fairer Schulze beatpath
and some method that has sufficient "lucidity" that voters can
understand it and have confidence that no "funny business" is going
on. but whether it's beatpath or ranked-pairs or IRV rules as the
method that resolves a cycle, at least in this very rare occasion,
it's picking a non-Condorcet winner meaningfully, even if there are
conceptual ways to turn tactical with it. but then, how profitable
is it to vote tactically when there is little probability to the
conditions that would serve such tactical voting?
if it were one of those Condorcet methods and if there is little
likelihood of a cycle happening and if a savvy voter knows that, how
does it benefit his/her political interests to do anything other
than vote for their fav as their first choice and cover their ass
with a tolerable 2nd choice? how are they ever (assuming no cycle)
hurting their favorite or helping any unranked candidates (tied for
last place, in this voter's esteem) beat the 2nd choice? i really
find it hard to see the tactical interests as differing from the
sincere political interests.
r b-j
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