Hi Dave,
--- En date de : Sam 17.4.10, Dave Ketchum <da...@clarityconnect.com> a écrit :
> Why IRV? Have we not buried
> that deep enough? Why not Condorcet which does better
> with about the same voting?
In the context that I said I wanted to use IRV, I wanted to preserve
LNHarm. It's kind of a moot point since I don't think it can be done.
I would guess that certain Condorcet methods would do better than IRV
in general, but in the symmetric scenario, it's not as clear to me what
specific behavior we need. It would be enough for me to have incentives
that keep the scenario from degrading to something simpler. I do think
IRV would be adequate for that here.
> Why TTR? Shouldn't that be avoided if trying for a
> good method? TTR requires smart deciding as to which
> candidates to vote on.
I didn't really advocate TTR. The main thing that is nice about it is
that there is plenty of room for three viable candidates and the method
is very simple.
I don't think TTR voting strategy is a big problem. I'm more concerned
about TTR nomination strategy.
> Will not Condorcet attend to clones with minimum
> pain? Voters can rank them together (with equal or
> adjacent ranks).
The problem is that you have to get the voters to vote for those clones.
This is easier when there is no risk to doing so, and/or when they are
allowed to do something to aid the clone set without having to vote for
all of them (such as votes against).
I see Condorcet methods (the better ones) as a comprehensive solution
that comes without a guarantee or much study about what it might
accomplish. I know what I want to accomplish and I want to see if I can
find methods that will attend to that specifically. And perhaps more
simply.
> Does not Condorcet properly attend to "symmetric" with a
> voted cycle?
I responded to that above. It can, yes.
Kevin Venzke
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