----- Original Message ----- From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm ... > > That's UncAAO, right? I've considered adding it to my simulator, > but I'm > unsure of where the simulated voters should put the approval > cutoff.
Yes. I'm glad someone remembers UncAAO. I suggest using truncation as the approval cutoff, and using the same truncations that you do for Schulze wv. By the way, (contrary to Marcus' confusion) UncAAO does satisfy Monotonicity, Clone Independence, IDPA, and Independence from Non-Smith Alternatives, as well as the following: 1. It elects the same member of a clone set as the method would when restricted to the clone set. 2. If a candidate that beats the winner is removed, the winner is unchanged. 3. If an added candidate covers the winner, the new candidate becomes the new winner. 4. If the old winner covers an added candidate, the old winner still wins. 5. It always chooses from the uncovered set. 6. It is easy to describe: Initialize L to be an empty list. While there exists some alternative that covers every member of L, add to L the one (from among those) ranked on the greatest number of ballots. Elect the last candidate added to L. What other deterministic method (based on ranked ballots with truncations allowed) satisfies all of these criteria? ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info