If one of the finalists is chosen by a method that satisfies the majority criterion, then you can skip step one, and the method becomes smoother.
Here are some possibilities for the method that satisfies the majority criterion: DSC, Bucklin, and the following range ballot based method: Elect the candidate X with the greatest value of p such that more than p/2 percent of the ballots rate X at least p percent of the maxRange value. That method is similar to the one that Andy Jennings suggested recently, and which I think could be the method to choose the other finalist: Elect the candidate Y with the greatest value of p such that at least p percent of the ballots rate Y at p percent of the maxRange value or higher. If these last two methods are used to choose the finalists, X and Y, then a strict majority top rated candidate will automatically win. The voters don't have to agonize over approval cutoffs, they can just grade the candidates on a scale of zero to maxRange. In fact that's what Andy had in mind ... an approval-like method that sets the cutoff level (in the sense that Bucklin can be thought of as a method for setting the approval cutoff level), but in a more robust way than Bucklin. In addition the composite method is monotone, and at least marginally clone independent (i.e. in the same way that Range is).. ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
