From: Jameson Quinn > To be clear: if X and Y are the same, there's no need for a runoff?
That's right. I hope that isn't be too anticlimatic! > > 2011/7/23 > > > If one of the finalists is chosen by a method that satisfies > the majority > > criterion, then you can skip step > > one, and the method becomes smoother. > > > > Here are some possibilities for the method that satisfies the > majority> criterion: DSC, Bucklin, and the > > following range ballot based method: > > > > Elect the candidate X with the greatest value of p such that > more than p/2 > > percent of the ballots rate X at > > least p percent of the maxRange value. > > > > That method is similar to the one that Andy Jennings suggested > recently,> and which I think could be the > > method to choose the other finalist: > > > > Elect the candidate Y with the greatest value of p such that > at least p > > percent of the ballots rate Y at p > > percent of the maxRange value or higher. > > > > If these last two methods are used to choose the finalists, X > and Y, then a > > strict majority top rated > > candidate will automatically win. The voters don't have to > agonize over > > approval cutoffs, they can just > > grade the candidates on a scale of zero to maxRange. In fact > that's what > > Andy had in mind ... an > > approval-like method that sets the cutoff level (in the sense > that Bucklin > > can be thought of as a method > > for setting the approval cutoff level), but in a more robust > way than > > Bucklin. In addition the composite > > method is monotone, and at least marginally clone independent > (i.e. in the > > same way that Range is).. > > ---- ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info