Jameson:
You said:
Reductio ad absurdem. One voter, two candidates. Preference-based
criterion: "If the voter votes for A but actually prefers B, then B should
win".
[endquote]
Remember that you, not I, propose that criterion.
You continue:
But, people say, what if they meant to vote for A? Nope, you say,
doesn't fit the criterion.
[endquote]
Nonsense. How do you propose to establish that someone preferred the one
that s/he voted against, especially if s/he denies it?
Your criterion is unusable.
You continue:
So fine, I can find whether system X meets this
criterion
[endquote]
No, you can't.
That's because you have no way of determinng someone's
preferences independent of their expression of them.
You continue:
but we can't have a reasonable conversation about it
[endquote]
You got that part right.
You continue:
, because
half of the relevant examples are somehow arbitrarily outlawed because they
don't "fit".
[endquote]
No, it's because your criterion relies on unavailable information.
You continue:
Preference-mentioning criterion: "Imagine the voter prefers B, but due to
an epileptic seizure, votes for A. The correct winner in this case would be
B. Therefore, whenever we see a vote for A, we should elect B."
[endquote]
Again, that's _your_ preference-mentioning criterion. Understand that. I agree
that
your criterion is ridiculous.
You continue:
I'm
just saying that a criterion can be justified on the basis of preferences,
but, like the system itself, must ultimately speak in terms of ballots and
results.
[endquote]
Hello? I guess it's necessary to repeat this again:
My preference criteria stipulate preferences and relation between preferences
and
voting. Thereby, they indirectly stipulate about ballots.
Mike Ossipoff
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