> > > Condorcet's Criterion: > > If, for every y not x, no fewer people prefer x to y than y to x, and > everyone votes sincerely, > then x should win. > > My point is that this is equivalent to:
If the ballots are such that it could be the case that, for every y not x, no fewer people prefer x to y than y to x, and everyone votes sincerely, then x should win. By "equivalent" I mean that it is passed and failed by exactly the same methods. But my statement is still better in that it prevents pedants from refusing to face cases where the criterion-required behavior may not actually be a good idea. This of course means that no limited-slot method can ever pass the Condorcet criterion except in a ballots-only sense. Jameson
---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
