> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: robert bristow-johnson <r...@audioimagination.com> > To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com > Date: Thu, 24 Nov 2011 15:50:02 -0500 > Subject: Re: [EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage. > On 11/24/11 2:20 PM, David L Wetzell wrote: > >> Let me start off by saying that I'm thankful for this list-serve of >> people passionate about electoral reform >> and that you put together a working consensus statement. I'm trying to >> work it some more... >> >> My belief is that the US's system makes it necessary to frame electoral >> reform simply and to limit the options proffered. >> > > but they should be *good* options. limiting the proffered options to IRV > is proven by our experience in Vermont to eventually fail. >
dlw: That is a huge non sequitur. Vermont proved nothing, other than the need to prepare for counter-IRV activism. We face the problem of induction and the hazard of drawing strong inference in the face of small sample sizes ;-). > > This is what FairVote does and they do it well. >> > > no they don't. FairVote sells ranked-choice voting and the IRV/STV method > of tabulating the ranked ballots as if they are the same thing. i.e., once > they convince voters, city councilors, and legislators that ranked-choice > voting is a good thing (by accurately pointing out what is wrong with FPTP > in a multiparty context and/or viable independent candidates), they present > IRV as it is the only solution. that backfired BIG TIME here in Burlington > Vermont. > dlw: I see, you're from Burlington... The counter IRV campaign may have won, but we are too close to the event to judge rightly its wider significance. The bigger story is that democracy remains an ongoing experiment. > > If you're going to undercut their marketing strategy then ethically the >> burden of proof is on you wrt providing a clear-cut alternative to IRV3. >> > > Condorcet. > b.s. In a world full of low-info voters and fuzzy-choices among political candidates, rankings don't have the weight that rational choice theorists purport for them. > > which Condorcet method i am not so particular about, but simplicity is > good. Schulze may be the best from a functional POV (resistance to > strategy) but, while i have a lot of respect for Markus, the Schulze method > appears complicated and will be a hard sell. i also do not think that > cycles will be common in governmental elections and am convinced that when > a cycle rarely occurs, it will never involve more than 3 candidates in the > Smith set. given a bunch of Condorcet-compliant methods that all pick the > same winner in the 3-candidate Smith set, the simplest method should be the > one marketed to the public and to legislators. > What works best for wines among wine connoisseurs will not work best for politicians among hacks. dlw > > >
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