okay, David, the subject is not about me (nor Kristofer), but about
election methods. let's let the Subject: header reflect the subject of
discussion, not the discussors.
On 11/24/11 9:05 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: robert bristow-johnson <r...@audioimagination.com
<mailto:r...@audioimagination.com>>
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
<mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com>
Date: Thu, 24 Nov 2011 15:50:02 -0500
Subject: Re: [EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage.
On 11/24/11 2:20 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
Let me start off by saying that I'm thankful for this
list-serve of people passionate about electoral reform
and that you put together a working consensus statement. I'm
trying to work it some more...
My belief is that the US's system makes it necessary to frame
electoral reform simply and to limit the options proffered.
but they should be *good* options. limiting the proffered options
to IRV is proven by our experience in Vermont to eventually fail.
dlw: That is a huge non sequitur.
it is precisely what we are talking about. how is it non sequitur? how
is offering simple choice of crappy options a useful reform?
Vermont proved nothing, other than the need to prepare for
counter-IRV activism.
there's truth to the latter half of that statement.
We face the problem of induction and the hazard of drawing strong
inference in the face of small sample sizes ;-).
it's not because Burlington is small and it's not because we used IRV
only twice (if the rocket detonates at launch the second time, we start
looking at that as a 50% failure rate before just moving along to the
next launch). it's because IRV failed in a context where the "spoiler"
was not a minor candidate. when there are three or more candidates all,
with a good chance of winning, IRV can fail and the election in
Burlington is a textbook example how and why.
and just like we identify the failure of the use of the Electoral
College when it chooses a different presidential candidate than the
popular vote, we identify the failure of IRV when an Condorcet winner
exists and IRV did not elect that CW. then all sorts of pathologies or
anomalies (thwarted majority, spoiler, reward strategic voting or punish
sincere voting, monotonicity) resulted as cascaded consequences. it's
really gonna be a textbook case. perhaps IRV advocates might start
wising up from it.
This is what FairVote does and they do it well.
no they don't. FairVote sells ranked-choice voting and the
IRV/STV method of tabulating the ranked ballots as if they are the
same thing. i.e., once they convince voters, city councilors, and
legislators that ranked-choice voting is a good thing (by
accurately pointing out what is wrong with FPTP in a multiparty
context and/or viable independent candidates), they present IRV as
it is the only solution. that backfired BIG TIME here in
Burlington Vermont.
dlw: I see, you're from Burlington... The counter IRV campaign may
have won, but we are too close to the event to judge rightly its wider
significance. The bigger story is that democracy remains an ongoing
experiment.
but the immediate story is that IRV *failed*, in 2009, to do what it was
adopted for in 2005. there was a lot of people that came to the
conclusion that FairVote sorta "sold us a bill of goods".
If you're going to undercut their marketing strategy then
ethically the burden of proof is on you wrt providing a
clear-cut alternative to IRV3.
Condorcet.
b.s.
what's BS? that Condorcet is an alternative to IRV (and to FPTP)? that
it is clear and cut? that, in 2009, it would have avoided the anomalies
(Warren would call them "pathologies") that IRV had?
In a world full of low-info voters and fuzzy-choices among political
candidates, rankings don't have the weight that rational choice
theorists purport for them.
what do you mean: "weight"? rankings are just rankings. if a voter
ranks Candidate A above Candidate B (independent of what the absolute
rank values are), all that means is that this voter would vote for A if
it were a simple two-candidate race with B. and all Condorcet seeks to
accomplish is to be consistent with that social choice regardless if
Candidate C or Candidate D were in the race or not.
it's pretty simple:
1. if a majority of voters agree that Candidate A is a better choice for
office than Candidate B, then Candidate B is not elected. this imposes
consistency with the 2-candidate race where we all agree who should be
elected and why.
2. the relative merit of Candidate A to Candidate B is not affected by
the presence of a third candidate, C. in the converse, this means that
removing any loser from the race and the ballot, that this should not
change who the winner is. if it does, that loser is a "spoiler". it is
precisely the motivation for adopting IRV in the first place.
3. voters should not be called upon to do strategic or tactical voting.
voters should not have to consider the tactic of "compromising" and
forsake their favorite candidate just to prevent aiding the election of
their least favorite candidate.
4. election policy that decreases convenience for voters decreases voter
turnout. with similar benefits as "motor voter", election policy that
increases convenience (like not making voters return for a runoff) will
increase voter turnout. electing candidates with decreased voter
participation cannot be considered as "democratic" as electing
candidates with greater voter participation (negative campaigns try to
keep voters home from voting by decreasing their support for the
opposing candidate). it is well known that nearly half of the
electorate (who voted on Election Day) stay home from runoff elections.
settling the election on Election Day eliminates this additional filter,
keeping out the less committed and less informed or aware. but
democracy is not about keeping voters from the polls. however, it does
impose upon voters to make up their minds about the candidates by
Election Day.
these are principles for which we in Burlington adopted IRV in the first
place, and in 2009, IRV failed the first three. it also failed to be
monotonic (some folks would make that Principle 5 saying something like
"voters have a right to know that their vote increases their candidate's
chances of being elected, not decreases it), and it failed precinct
summability (perhaps Principle 6) which alarms the transparency advocates.
which Condorcet method i am not so particular about, but
simplicity is good. Schulze may be the best from a functional POV
(resistance to strategy) but, while i have a lot of respect for
Markus, the Schulze method appears complicated and will be a hard
sell. i also do not think that cycles will be common in
governmental elections and am convinced that when a cycle rarely
occurs, it will never involve more than 3 candidates in the Smith
set. given a bunch of Condorcet-compliant methods that all pick
the same winner in the 3-candidate Smith set, the simplest method
should be the one marketed to the public and to legislators.
What works best for wines among wine connoisseurs will not work best
for politicians among hacks.
it's about the social choice about what is the best thing to do
(specifically who, in a collective judgment, is the best candidate to
place in office). all of these Chardonnay drinkers that don't know any
better need to be educated to what a Pinot Noir is.
--
r b-j r...@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
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