I don't doubt that Asset has some desirable properties, but trying to compare it to "conservative" methods like STV is difficult. In particular, conservative multiwinner methods are more amenable to Bayesian Regret-type simulations than methods with districts, parties, or candidates capable of making decisions as well as to more traditional analyses with specific criteria that a given method either passes or fails. It's hard to apply either approach to comparing such different methods against each other, even though it's relatively easy to compare methods within a class (e.g. methods with parties, methods with agent-like candidates).
On Tue, Jan 8, 2013 at 10:35 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <a...@lomaxdesign.com>wrote: > At 03:24 AM 1/8/2013, Greg Nisbet wrote: > >> There's some definite motivation for writing the list of criteria to >> exclude parties, districts, and relying on candidates making decisions. >> These sorts of mechanisms are not always available (for instance, picking >> pizza toppings or locations or something of that nature). That's not to say >> that these methods are never useful or not "competitive" with party-less, >> district-less, candidate-decision-less methods in some sense ... it's just >> harder to compare their merits in some sort of "universal" sense without >> considering very specific factors about the community associated with the >> election. In that sense, limiting focus to methods that don't impose these >> sorts of additional structure or requirements on the candidates or voters >> helps to simplify things rather dramatically. >> > > Sure. It *also* can be expected to produce results that are less than > optimal. > > "Relying on candidates" to make decisions is a narrow view of Asset > Voting. Rather, Asset Voting delegates decision-making, not to > "candidates," per se, but electors. Because we are so accustomed to voting > for "candidates," we overlook this when we think of Asset. > > In the Pizza election, obviously the Pizza doesn't decide (but that > Mushroom-Olive pizza makes a mean argument!). But one could perfectly well, > in a complex multiple-choice "election," choose, not the result, but who or > what process makes the choice. > > However, there is a classic method for doing this that works perfectly > well, and it is simply supermajority rule, even consensus process. (If the > majority feels that the group is taking too long, "We're hungry, dammit!" > the majority can simply make its own decision, and invite others to join, o > not.) The real point is that classic decision-making process is > *interative*. It is not a simple one-shot amalgamation. In classic process, > someone may say, "Let's get a Pepperon Pizze!" and the group shouts "Yes." > Supermajority. But then someone says, "I really can't eat that!" And the > majority will, in a functional social group, back up. > > Range voting can be used to speed this up, but the "speed up" only will > occur with fairly large groups, and especially groups that cannot meet in > person. In person, Approval is the departure from traditional formal > process that makes sense. The final key to showing a decent decision is a > *ratification,* if there is any doubt. I've seen an apparent 97% A, 70% B, > under Approval, turn into 100% A, no exceptions, when presented for > ratification, but this was in person. This whole process can take less time > than setting up and adding up the votes for a Range poll. > > Asset can pick a result that would be *completely* unexpected, something > entirely outside of initial consideration. Asset can be understood very > simply: instead of making decisions only from ballots, delegate the final > decision process to representatives, for efficiency. With the pizza > election suppose that it develops that all but one member of the group > *really wants* pepperoni, and one can't eat pepperoni. The problem with > buying separate pizzas is that a smaller pizza, or by the slice, is more > expensive. However, the group, if it wants to accomodate the minority > person, could in fact, decide to by two pizzas, one small, and could > present the contribution to be put in to be sufficient to buy both pizzas > (if we assume equal contributions, say). Or someone could decide to > contribute a bit more. Balancing all this, discussing it, etc, could be > difficult, but if two people end up discussing what to do, it's quite > possible that 100% consensus could be obtained on a result. Everyone would > agree that the result is fair. > > The universe of possible "candidates" is large! > > The complexities of various voting systems arise from the limitations, > generally, of single-poll pure amalgamation processes. Asset is a *generic > solution,* and it works without party structures or districts. (Asset can > work for district elections, but the universality of representation is > damaged, that's all.) Short of Asset, various reformed versions of Majority > have been suggested, with the compromise that a runoff can complete with a > Plurality result. I've shown how a maximum 2-poll system can satisfy the > Condorcet Criterion, for example, with an appropriate first-poll ballot. > > (Esentially, range polls collect the most detailed voter preference > information, and, with decent rules, can be interpreted as ranked ballots. > Hence I highly recommend range ballots, which would include Bucklin with > balanced preference options (standard Bucklin was Range 4, but with a > missing disapproved rank). Range resolution can be increased for larger > candidate sets. And Asset could actually be used as a tweak to increase > majority completion rates.) >
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