Hi Alan, On Thu, June 24, 2010 5:20 am, Alan DeKok wrote: > Glen Zorn wrote: >> Alan DeKok [mailto:al...@deployingradius.com] writes: >>> The requirement to keep authentication credentials private, which is >>> one of the reasons for choosing a TLS-based method in the first place. >> >> Are you confused? We're talking about being able to authenticate the >> visited network, not tunnel method requirements... > > Your proposal authenticates the visited network, at the cost of > exposing the users authentication credentials to the visited network, > and to everyone else in the proxy chain. This fails the privacy > requirements of any TLS-based EAP method, and has nothing at all to do > with the tunnel method requirements.
I may be missing something but the key shared by the client and the NAS is going to be known by the proxies in that chain so what sort of problem is being solved by applying these privacy requirements to proxies? There are man-in-the-middle attacks and dictionary attacks possible by an attacker between the client and the NAS and these tunneled EAP methods address that. But if you think that it's a problem for a proxy between the TTLS server and the AAA server to see the client's credentials then don't you think it's a (bigger) problem that this proxy will have access to the client's key? Dan. _______________________________________________ Emu mailing list Emu@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
