On 01/06/2015 04:23 PM, Patrick Brunschwig wrote:

> The point here is (I know, it's not well enough documented) that I
> decided to ignore per-recipient rules for BCC recipient; and we also
> decided to exclude BCC recipients from some of the logic for
> enabling/disabling encryption. Unfortunately I don't recall the reasons.

One possible reason could be:

 * under "convenient encryption", when all to: and cc: addresses have
keys, adding a bcc: address that does not have a key causes encryption
to be disabled.

However, in the same circumstance, adding that address to: or cc: would
have the same effect, so i don't think this is a particularly good reason.

I think the right thing to do is to treat Bcc: recipients the same as
the To: or Cc: recipients, whether that's with "convenient" settings or
per-address rules.

I believe this is a closer match to most users' expectations of what
should happen.

------

More nuanced details related to OpenPGP, encryption, and BCC (which i
think enigmail already gets right, but i think are worth noting in this
context):

The one drawback to this plan is that the OpenPGP packet format makes it
clear to which keys a message has been encrypted, in the keyID field of
each PKESK packet:

 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.1

this potentially makes the Bcc not very blind, because the recipient can
enumerate PKESKs.

The fix for this is to always send the Bcc address to gpg as
--hidden-recipient, which enigmail does. (this sets the keyID field to
all-zeros for that PKESK)

So this still leaks some information that *someone* else has gotten a
copy, but not who, which i think is acceptable.

Note, though, that if the hidden recipient PKESK is placed ahead of the
regular non-hidden PKESK, then some (all?) versions of GnuPG will ask
the (non-bcc) recipients to unlock all their private keys to try to
decrypt the hidden PKESK before processing the PKESK that belongs to
them.  This is pretty annoying for people who have more than one secret
key available, so placing all hidden PKESKs *after* the non-hidden
PKESKs should reduce the annoyance.

I think that enigmail already does this properly as well, assuming that
GnuPG's emitted PKESKs match the order of the --recipient and
--hidden-recipient arguments.

        --dkg

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