There are many thinking issues in Georges' exposition above. One might draw on something like the Monty Hall exercise to get at some of the feeling involved. This concerns a prize being put behind one of three doors. You get to choose one door, then Monty (who knows where the prize is) opens one of the doors where the prize isn't, leaving you with a choice between two doors. Simple thinking has it that the choice is now one of fifty-fifty. This ain't the case. No discussion on the probability per se - you can find the arguments at http://www.scientificamerican.com/podcast/episode.cfm?id=lets-make-a-probabilistic-deal-a-fr-11-06-25.
If I'm the contestant, then my chances are better than 50 - 50 if I change my original decision. Many people reason that it doesn't make any difference since there are two possibilities, and thus the probability is 1/2 that the car is behind the original door. The correct strategy, however, calls for the contestant to switch. The probability he picked the correct door originally is 1/3, and the probability the car is behind one of the other two unopened doors is 2/3. Since the host is required to open a door behind which there's a booby prize, the 2/3 probability is now concentrated on the other unopened door. Switching to it will increase the contestant's chances of winning from 1/3 to 2/3. This is entirely uninteresting as standard maths. It's supported by doing the stuff over and over. So, imagine me as the contestant and Georges as the 'lovely assistant' in constant repetitions of the game. He just gets to come on with no knowledge of my choice or that there ever is anything other than the two doors to choose from. He is in the toss of a coin situation. If Georges never knew anything about the third door, he would never play cards with me! So how is my choice affected by this somewhat indirect information? It isn't my knowledge of probability theory as any mug who knows to change his original choice will do as well as me. No doubt the actual Georges would catch on, but this ain't the point either. It's the discomfort of examples like this that interests me. Most people won't change their original choice even after the solution is explained to them, even by demonstration. In the first half of the twentieth century, however, empiricism came predominantly in the form of varieties of “instrumentalism”: the view that theories are merely instruments for predicting observable phenomena or systematizing observation reports. Traditionally, instrumentalists maintain that terms for unobservables, by themselves, have no meaning; construed literally, statements involving them are not even candidates for truth or falsity. The most influential advocates of instrumentalism were the logical empiricists (or logical positivists), including Carnap and Hempel, famously associated with the Vienna Circle group of philosophers and scientists as well as important contributors elsewhere. In order to rationalize the ubiquitous use of terms which might otherwise be taken to refer to unobservables in scientific discourse, they adopted a non-literal semantics according to which these terms acquire meaning by being associated with terms for observables (for example, ‘electron’ might mean ‘white streak in a cloud chamber’), or with demonstrable laboratory procedures (a view called ‘operationalism’). Insuperable difficulties with this semantics led ultimately (in large measure) to the demise of logical empiricism and the growth of realism. The contrast here is not merely in semantics and epistemology: a number of logical empiricists also held the neo-Kantian view that ontological questions “external” to the frameworks for knowledge represented by theories are also meaningless (the choice of a framework is made solely on pragmatic grounds), thereby rejecting the metaphysical dimension of realism. This, of course, is a long way from the realism of booting a stone with your toe to defeat solipsism. Social constructivists have also held sway. By making social factors an inextricable, substantive determinant of what counts as true or false in the realm of the sciences (and elsewhere), social constructivism stands opposed to the realist contention that theories can be understood as furnishing knowledge of a mind-independent world. And as in the historicist approach, notions such as truth, reference, and ontology are here relative to particular contexts, and have no context-transcendent significance. The later work of Kuhn and Wittgenstein in particular were influential in the development of the Strong Program doctrine of “meaning finitism”, according to which the meanings of terms are conceived as social institutions: the various ways in which they are used successfully in communication within a linguistic community (sort of consensual). This theory of meaning forms the basis of an argument to the effect that the meanings of scientific terms (inter alia) are products of social negotiation and need not be fixed or determinate, which further conflicts with a number of realist notions, including the idea of convergence towards true theories, improvements with respect to ontology or approximate truth, and determinate reference to mind-independent entities, properties, and relations. The subject of neo-Kantianism thus emerges here again, though its strength in constructivist doctrines varies significantly. Wittgenstein had no truck with consensus or socially approved epistemic justification and in social science much of this stuff was used to allow the bleatings of morons to count as knowledge of something other than the moron plight. I'm aware of philosophy, but its hold on real research is dubious. Plenty of good work has nothing to do with knowledge of it as Georges points out above. The irresolvability of debates concerning realism may be due to certain meta-philosophical commitments adopted by the relevant interlocutors. The most sophisticated positions on either side now incorporate self-justifying conceptions of the aim of philosophy and of the standards of adequacy appropriate for judging philosophical theories of science. Different assumptions ab initio regarding what sorts of inferences are legitimate, what sorts of evidence reasonably support belief, whether there is a genuine demand for the explanation of observable phenomena in terms of underlying realities, and so on, may render some arguments between realists and antirealists question- begging. Neither realism nor antirealism is ruled out by plausible canons of rationality; each is sustained by a different conception of how much epistemic risk one should take in forming beliefs on the basis of one's evidence. An intriguing question then emerges as to whether disputes surrounding realism and antirealism are resolvable in principle, or whether, ultimately, internally consistent and coherent formulations of these positions should be regarded as irreconcilable but nonetheless permissible interpretations of scientific knowledge. Not very likely to pull me away from the bench then. Kant can offer no authority in any of this and I suspect this was the message he intended in providing the basics for the dispatch of pure reason following Hume. My own philosophy is based on little more than 'what the fuck is going on then' and four of Bacon's Idols as they refer to others and me. Tribe, cave, marketplace and theatre. Understand "realism" Chazzer, before you get mugged by vandals from the theatre posing as knowing Kantians. They are stuck with 17th century science at best and probably not even that. They probably think Newton was a mechanist and Einstein invented relativity. These are the arses who would not believe me on Monty Hall's door because I'm fat! Did you manage to lose weight mate? Been a while (Neil). On Jun 26, 2:56 pm, Georges Metanomski <zg...@yahoo.com> wrote: > There was lately a lot of talk about Kant in google/epistemology. > Let me but in a bit and post an excerpt of myhttp://findgeorges.com/ > Due to the general interest of the issue I post it to several lists. > > ============= > KANT'S FOUNDATIONAL VIEW > > Kant's view may only be understood as foundation of the First > Enlightenment, as ontological support of the First Scientific > Revolution culminating in Newton's Model. We have seen that the > latter led to paradoxes which Newton dodged with his "hypotheses > non fingo" implying that physics does not deal with philosophical > foundations. Kant could of course not follow him there, as his > job consisted precisely in dealing with philosophical foundations. > Consequently, he conceived paradoxical foundations of paradoxical > science. With the advent of our Second Scientific Revolution, > Kant's view lost all avail and keeps for us only historical and > methodological interest. Especially the latter, showing how one > can sincerely derive an ontology rigorously supporting concurrent > science art and know-how. We follow this example endeavoring > to conceive an ontology rigorously underlying Einstein's Second > Scientific Revolution. > > Kant's obsoleteness is the best guarantee of his greatness. > Philosophical views, unlike the scientific, don't follow a progress, > but come and go like waves on a pond, apparently contradicting one > another without these contradictions affecting them in any way, > nor thwarting them from springing in again. > There is little, if any sincere research of truth in established > philosophy. A view ressurrects just because a clever guy picks it up > for his thesis, knowing that it will flatter his supervisor and such > "peers" as he knows will review it. Neo-platonisms, neo-phenomenalisms, > neo-pata-physicalisms follow one another like waves on the ducks > pond ot the Reeking Valley without leaving any traces. > But Kant, leaving for obsoleteness left behind as deep traces as Newton > whom he underlaid. > > KANT's AXIOMATIC > > Discussing Kant may follow one of two ways: > > 1.Learn to use his terminology inside of the Universe of > discourse of his time. Only after having accomplished that > would we be able to talk reasonably about "synthetic > judgements a priori" and their role in "transcendental logic, > or aesthetic". > > 2.Express his Weltanschaung in contemporary terms. > > We shall follow the second approach. > > Any theory is for us, today, axiomatic. What would we see as > axioms and theorems of Kant's Weltanschauung? > > Axiom A1: necessary and universal science exists. > > Axiom A2: Science is created by inductive inference. > > Axiom A3: Only a priori inference is necessary and > universal. > > Axiom A4: Induction a priori requires subjective > representations a priori (categories) encompassing space and > time. > > Axiom A5: Space and time are subjective representations a > priori. (According to Kant we can imagine "empty space" > without any "objects"[3] but we can only represent objects > in space. The same holds for time.) > > Theorem T1, concluded from Axioms: Induction a priori is > possible, necessary and universal. > > COMMENTS > > A1: At Kant's epoch the First Scientific Revolution had > culminated in Newton's Model, whose rules and concepts were > considered as exact, necessary and universal. Even the 19th > century mechanistic Physics claimed those qualities. Only > the Einstanian Second Scientific Revolution turned to consider > science as fuzzy, relative and restricted, making A1 > unacceptable for us. > > A2: We nearly agree with it: for us the inductive inference > "verifies" rather than "creates" science. > > A3,A4,T1: We accept now only induction a posteriori. > > A5: Kant's main objective was to create the > "Transcendental Logic" with induction a priori in its > center. For this purpose A5 was a necessary addition > to A1. Yet, "Empty space" and "objects in space" are > clearly illusions of the "Naive View" (aka "Naive > Realism"). We had to wait for the Extended Relativity > to see the "empty space" abolished and replaced with > P_Equivalence of SPACE and Field. [4] > > Transcendental Logic: Kant tried to create what > appears to us as a "prototype" of Propositional > Calculus. He failed due to missing mathematical and > logical tools, mainly the Boole Algebra. > He considered only statements, or, as we would say > "operands", but neglected the operators. His 'Logic" > was in fact just a classification of statements: > > -Statements analytical a priori which we would call > deductive, > > -Statements synthetical a posteriori which we would > call inductive, > > -Statements synthetical a priori supposed to support > the induction a priori, unacceptable for us. > > [3] The term "object" does not exist in Physics. In the > metalanguage it is multivalued and charged with noxious > metaphysical connotations. We use it here in order not to > diverge too far from Kant's terminology, as synonym > of "event". > > [4] Phenomenal Equivalence (P-Equivalence): > Association of Aspects of a Phenomenon (Field Density > and SPACE curvature are P-Equivalent Aspects of the > Phenomenon "Cosmos"). P-Equivalence is often confused > with Causality. Its customary to say that "Field > curves SPACE", which is false, as they are both > "equally ranked" Aspects of a Phenomenon, coexisting > but not causing one another. > Similarly, continuous Field wave and discrete photons > are P-Equivalent Aspects of the Phenomenon "Light". > > Einstein's lapsus > > Einstein: > Concepts and Conceptual Systems get justified exclusively > by their capacity to coordinate events. They cannot be > justified in any other way. Therefore, it is, in my opinion, > one of the most pernicious acts of Philosophers to have > transferred some conceptual bases of Natural Science from > the controllable domain of empiric adequacy into inaccessible > height of the Necessary Apriori. This applies particularly > to our concepts of time and space, which the Physicists > - forced by the facts - had to descend from the Olympus > of Apriori in order to repair them and make them usable. > > Einstein blamed Kant for having transferred some conceptual > bases of Natural Science (mainly time and space) from the > controllable domain of empiric adequacy into the inaccessible > heights of the Necessary Apriori. > > Tatarkiewicz stood up for Kant who sincerely and rigorously > derived his view from his concurrent physics. > > It's the Galilean Relativity which was based on absolute time > and space, and Einstein should have more justly blamed Galileo > and Newton. But, on the one hand, one does not see Einstein > blaming his masters on whose shoulders he always declared to > stand, and, on the other hand, they could hardly be blamed, > as nothing in their time could possibly call in question the > absolute time and space. > > Newton's and Kant's Paradoxes > > Newton's Paradoxes > > -First Paradox: Gravity attraction intervenes between such > remote bodies as sun and earth which appears as Action at > Distance violating the basic Mechanistic dogma of "billiard > balls" acting locally on one another. > > -Second Paradox: Gravity attraction is determined by space > (distance), but does not affect it in any way, which > violates the Reciprocity Principle (Action / Reaction). > > Newton was perfectly aware of the Paradoxes which clearly > called into question the Noumenalistic dogma of absolute > space and its Mechanistic fabric of "billiard balls". > Questioned about them he refused to be dragged into > metaphysical speculations and answered with his famous > "Hypotheses non fingo", implying that Science coordinates > empiric data into consistent, predictable and verifiable > Models, but refrains from explaining them in terms of > Transcendency. > (Closer to us, Dirac repeated it in similar situation with > coarser terms: "Shut up and compute".) > > The Paradoxes were solved by Einstein's Relativity replacing > Mechanistic dogma with the Phenomenal concept of Field and > its P-Equivalence with SPACE, both expanding at invariant > speed C as a continuous propagation of Local impulses. > Einstein rated the solution of Newton's Paradoxes as his > topmost achievement, because he admired Newton and considered > him as his Master. > > We find it rather diverting that Newton's First Paradox may > be seen in inverted order. His Gravity apparently acting at > distance, in fact anticipated (extended) Locality by the > implication of continuous Field. On the other hand, the > pretended local action of hypothetical "billiard balls" > meant actually Action at Distance, small or rather undefined > distance of "balls" diameter, but distance anyhow. > > Kant's Paradoxes > > Kant has the historical merit of deriving Ontology of the > First Enlightenment from empirically verifiable Science, > rather than founding it, as it was the habit, in arbitrary, > aprioristic speculations. He derived his system from the > summit of his contemporary Science represented by Newton's > Model with additional postulate of Science being exact, > necessary and universal, thus absolute. Now, Newton's Model, > as all Physics of his time was based upon metaphysical dogma > of absolute time/space affine between time and space (lacking > a common measure) and having the fabric of "billiard balls". > These dogmatic foundations were in contradiction with Model's > physical laws. Facing it, Newton dodged the issue with his > famous "Hypotheses non fingo" implying that he restricted > himself to Physics and dismissed Philosophy. > > Kant could of course not follow Newton in dismissing > Philosophy, as it was his essential dedication. Consequently, > and unlike Newton, he did endeavor to "make hypothesis", to > conceive Foundations of Science consistent with Newton's > Model. In doing so he chose the sincere, bona fide attitude > of deriving Ontology from the bedrock premise of empirically > verifiable physical Model. However, no matter how rigorous > the inference, the conclusion is only as good as the > premise: from a paradoxical Model Kant rigorously derived > a paradoxical Ontology. > > 1.Having rightly banned noumena (Dinge an Sich) from human > cognition, he created a Noumenalistic Ontology based on such ... > > read more » -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Epistemology" group. To post to this group, send email to epistemology@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to epistemology+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/epistemology?hl=en.
