Sounds like you are a hopeless realist that thinks your senses give
you a hot-line to reality central.
They don't!


On Jun 26, 7:51 pm, nominal9 <nomin...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> Hi Chaz....
> Frankly, I consider Kant to have been the first of the
> Phenomenologists.... before Husserl, et al....
> As a Nominalist-leaning person, myself.... Phenomenologists are the
> bane of my existence, I find that I have nothing that I agree with in
> common with them, epistemologically... our "views" are diametrically
> opposed....
> I think we've had this discussion.... or parts of it.....before....
>
> Maybe you've seen that, when it comes to Kant's
> terminology....phenomenon and noumenon, especially....and the
> resulting Kant notions of the "essences" of knowledge.....
>
> Well... that's just "spaced-out" Mumbo-Jumbo.... like being on a
> constant "drug-high".... when it comes to experiencing "things".....
>
> That's my own opinion , of course... and I've put it in a very
> "aggressively" critical, "common-language" form.... just to get you to
> think about it
>
> On Jun 25, 3:41 am, chazwin <chazwy...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> > In what way is Kant justifiably called a Subjectivist or Idealist?
>
> > We are perfectly justified in maintaining that only what is within
> > ourselves can be immediately and directly perceived, and that only my
> > own existence can be the object of a mere perception. Thus the
> > existence of a real object outside me can never be given immediately
> > and directly in perception, but can only be added in thought to the
> > perception, which is a modification of the internal sense, and thus
> > inferred as its external cause … . In the true sense of the word,
> > therefore, I can never perceive external things, but I can only infer
> > their existence from my own internal perception, regarding the
> > perception as an effect of something external that must be the
> > proximate cause … . It must not be supposed, therefore, that an
> > idealist is someone who denies the existence of external objects of
> > the senses; all he does is to deny that they are known by immediate
> > and direct perception … .
> > —Critique of Pure Reason, A367 f.
>
> > Given this statement, how is any position which asserts a Realist
> > position ever justifiable?

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