Hi Chaz.... Frankly, I consider Kant to have been the first of the Phenomenologists.... before Husserl, et al.... As a Nominalist-leaning person, myself.... Phenomenologists are the bane of my existence, I find that I have nothing that I agree with in common with them, epistemologically... our "views" are diametrically opposed.... I think we've had this discussion.... or parts of it.....before....
Maybe you've seen that, when it comes to Kant's terminology....phenomenon and noumenon, especially....and the resulting Kant notions of the "essences" of knowledge..... Well... that's just "spaced-out" Mumbo-Jumbo.... like being on a constant "drug-high".... when it comes to experiencing "things"..... That's my own opinion , of course... and I've put it in a very "aggressively" critical, "common-language" form.... just to get you to think about it On Jun 25, 3:41 am, chazwin <chazwy...@yahoo.com> wrote: > In what way is Kant justifiably called a Subjectivist or Idealist? > > We are perfectly justified in maintaining that only what is within > ourselves can be immediately and directly perceived, and that only my > own existence can be the object of a mere perception. Thus the > existence of a real object outside me can never be given immediately > and directly in perception, but can only be added in thought to the > perception, which is a modification of the internal sense, and thus > inferred as its external cause … . In the true sense of the word, > therefore, I can never perceive external things, but I can only infer > their existence from my own internal perception, regarding the > perception as an effect of something external that must be the > proximate cause … . It must not be supposed, therefore, that an > idealist is someone who denies the existence of external objects of > the senses; all he does is to deny that they are known by immediate > and direct perception … . > —Critique of Pure Reason, A367 f. > > Given this statement, how is any position which asserts a Realist > position ever justifiable? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Epistemology" group. To post to this group, send email to epistemology@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to epistemology+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/epistemology?hl=en.
