On Jun 26, 5:41 am, archytas <nwte...@gmail.com> wrote: > Hi Chaz, > > Non-realism can take many forms, depending on whether or not it is the > existence or independence dimension of realism that is questioned or > rejected. The forms of non-realism can vary dramatically from subject- > matter to subject-matter, but error-theories, non-cognitivism, > instrumentalism, nominalism, certain styles of reductionism, and > eliminativism typically reject realism by rejecting the existence > dimension, while idealism, subjectivism, and anti-realism typically > concede the existence dimension but reject the independence dimension. > > It just gets harder and harder after this - so I settle down with > 'tropical fish realism' admitting my knowledge doesn't have > philosophic under-pinnings that can't be 'got at'. You and I both > think science has better stories than creationist turkeys. The > questions turn to why we think this. I will give up to some guy who > has raised tropical fish against my scant knowledge of this, though > not to the double-glazing salesman telling me his product will slash > my heating bills by massive amounts etc. > > I also find turkeys telling me the objective point of view is the one > without emotional colour - clear piss. Hume is now backed by a lot of > science done on human nature and the small role of rational > consciousness in it and what we know. Realism is not a system without > doubt - one notion of its necessity was to find an argument that > science is not a miracle - which it would have to be unless it was > describing actual reality. I know of at least two neo-Kantian > arguments against structural realism in science. > > Structural Realism comes from John Worrall (1989 ish) and he says he > found his structural realism in Henri Poincaré (1905, 1906) whose > structuralism was combined with neo-Kantian views about the nature of > arithmetic and group theory, and with conventionalism about the > geometry of space and time. According to Worrall, we should not accept > standard scientific realism, which asserts that the nature of the > unobservable objects that cause the phenomena we observe is correctly > described by our best theories. However, neither should we be > antirealists about science. Rather, we should adopt structural realism > and epistemically commit ourselves only to the mathematical or > structural content of our theories. One can distinguish epistemic and > ontic forms of these types of realism. Kant can be used in support of > this and against it. > > Carlos' piece above is fine, though what are we addressing concerning > the time before any 'I's' could do the addressing? I suppose the guy > who shouts 'blerddefuckbognorregis' may be on to something rather than > Lene Hau as we 'see' a photon trapped in a Bose-Einstein condensate > and a matter wave emerge, but I'm not going with him unless pissed on > Bulgarian Raki. It does seem we can't separate observational and > theoretical language and be sensible enough to beware the guy carrying > a wet fish with form for slapping people in the face with such. And > 'see' the difference between the realist hypothesis on a blue book and > those of it as an illusion, appearance and so on. > > Much has been written on realism and space-time so I won't bother. > The problem Chaz puts forward is too simple.
It's the simple problems that cause maximal stress. You have sidestepped this one by introducing complexities that ignore the assertion. Were this so simple as the qualify for your dismissal then why is it that people can't seem to agree that this was what Kant meant, but they rather want to characterise him as some sort of mystical nutcase? It my way of thinking, this quote sums up my view on the truth of perception. Now contrast that with Nominal's utter abhorrence in his last post. The fact is that what appears obvious to me., deserves utter contempt from another - if that fact alone does not support subjectivism I can't think of a better example that does. > > On Jun 26, 12:26 am, Lonnie Clay <claylon...@comcast.net> wrote: > > > > > The society in which *I* live will *not* tolerate dissent or disruption. I > > have *personal* experience of that. See Wikipedia article "consensus > > reality". Mental health professional enforce the rules. > > > Lonnie Courtney Clay > > > On Saturday, June 25, 2011 12:36:48 PM UTC-7, chazwin wrote: > > > > On Jun 25, 8:55 am, Lonnie Clay <clayl...@comcast.net> wrote: > > > > I'll take a stab at it. If you deny consensus reality, then you *will* > > > > probably be declared insane. > > > > Whose consensus? Surely every Protestant denied the Catholic > > > consensus; the muslim denies the Christian; the Hindu the Buddhist ad > > > infinitem. > > > > There is no "consensus" reality. Surely that is simply the false claim > > > of the objectivist. > > > Given what Kant has shown, should we not treat with utter suspicion > > > any one who tries to claim that their position is objective? Is that > > > not the howl of the totalitarian? > > > > > So you must at least give lip service to the > > > > claim that Solipsism is a flawed philosophical view. Is that a good > > > enough > > > > response? It shows by implication nothing regarding my viewpoint since I > > > > have been declared insane... > > > > The moment I agree with your position we then share a consensus. But > > > it might be just us two that shares this point of view. If 10 others > > > disagree, does that make us mad and them sane? > > > And if society tells us that x,y, and z simply is the truth ought we > > > not to challenge that? > > > > > Lonnie Courtney Clay > > > > > On Saturday, June 25, 2011 12:41:34 AM UTC-7, chazwin wrote: > > > > > > In what way is Kant justifiably called a Subjectivist or Idealist? > > > > > > We are perfectly justified in maintaining that only what is within > > > > > ourselves can be immediately and directly perceived, and that only my > > > > > own existence can be the object of a mere perception. Thus the > > > > > existence of a real object outside me can never be given immediately > > > > > and directly in perception, but can only be added in thought to the > > > > > perception, which is a modification of the internal sense, and thus > > > > > inferred as its external cause … . In the true sense of the word, > > > > > therefore, I can never perceive external things, but I can only infer > > > > > their existence from my own internal perception, regarding the > > > > > perception as an effect of something external that must be the > > > > > proximate cause … . It must not be supposed, therefore, that an > > > > > idealist is someone who denies the existence of external objects of > > > > > the senses; all he does is to deny that they are known by immediate > > > > > and direct perception … . > > > > > —Critique of Pure Reason, A367 f. > > > > > > Given this statement, how is any position which asserts a Realist > > > > > position ever justifiable? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Epistemology" group. To post to this group, send email to epistemology@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to epistemology+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/epistemology?hl=en.
