http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/03/opinion/03MON1.html
...Beyond the technical inquiry, it will be imperative to look more broadly at the space agency's management of the shuttle program. It is disquieting to note that only last year the outgoing chairman of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel told Congress that he had never been so worried about shuttle safety as right now, mostly because safety upgrades were being postponed due to budget constraints. Although safety had not yet been compromised, he said, "nobody will know for sure when the safety margin has been eroded too far." Five of nine members of that safety panel and two consultants were removed, with some now accusing NASA of trying to suppress their criticism. Then there is the perplexing issue of the mind-set at NASA. The immediate cause of the Challenger accident 17 years ago was a faulty seal on a booster rocket that failed to close properly in cold weather, allowing hot gases to escape and trigger a conflagration. But the deeper cause was institutional. The seal problems had been analyzed for years by NASA, and the consensus was always that the shuttles were safe to fly. That confidence grew stronger with each passing flight - until it was blown to smithereens on a cold day in January 1986. When listening to NASA officials at their initial press conference on the Columbia accident, it was hard not to wonder if history could be repeating itself. Shuttle managers acknowledged that debris had broken away from the external tank on another recent shuttle flight. It hit one of the booster rockets, causing superficial damage, but was judged not to threaten shuttle safety. When debris broke loose again on this flight and hit the shuttle's wing, experts concluded that this event, too, did not threaten safety. Several years ago shuttles suffered tile damage from debris impacts and even lost portions of tiles, a problem said to be resolved. Always the damage was judged no threat to safety. Nobody knows if the debris shed during Columbia's launch caused this accident, but if it turns out to be the culprit, investigators will need to analyze how the technical reviews came to discount the problem. [ See http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/03/national/03WRON.html .] With the future of NASA and the shuttle program hanging on the outcome, the investigation must be as open and forthright as possible. It is perfectly appropriate for NASA and its contractors to take the lead in analyzing the technical failure. But it is discouraging that NASA, which famously tried to cover up its shortcomings in the early stages of the Challenger investigation, has chosen to convene an oversight board of safety officials from military and civilian agencies to give its investigation credibility. Whatever the qualifications of those individuals, they have neither the stature nor true independence needed for an accident of this magnitude. An independent presidential commission with distinguished members from the private sector investigated the Challenger accident. President Bush should appoint a similar panel to investigate this one while Congress pursues its own inquiries. _______________________ I will add only that CNN has also started quoting comments from various skeptical observers regarding the "independence" of that safety board. == You are subscribed to the Europa Icepick mailing list: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Project information and list (un)subscribe info: http://klx.com/europa/
