As to your last comment, one of the sketches I have on my drawing board (for later development) was a 3' long remote camera system for the ISS. It could easily be adapted to fit in the shuttle bay. Put it on the wall and launch it when needed. It runs around and takes pictures.
The reality is what do you do if you find a damaged tile? Go out an fix it? There are no provisions (or equipment) designed for in flight tile repair. So now the crew knows they can't come home and there is no rescue in sight. Orbital mechanics makes it impossible the get anywhere else (like the ISS). This will sound harsh and it is not meant to. We should morn our loss and then get on with the task of making space safer. The shuttle is as safe as it can get. We know that we will lose 1 in 75 launches (how many flights have there been since the last disaster?). Let us accept that and start creating the next spacecraft. Sterile conjecture only sends us in circles. Only be doing something DIFFERENT that what we are now will bring about change. The next great space advancement will not come from NASA but from some guy probably without a degree who just 'thought something up one day.' Sorry for the diatribe. I am a bit upset that the blame game has already started. They should at least have decency to have the memorial service before that crap starts. Joe L. On Mon, 2003-02-03 at 10:33, Thomas Green wrote: > The tone of this line of reasoning does not seem to apply to the tragedy of > STS-107. > > 1. NASA would not launch the shuttle if there was *any* known potential for > failure. This is not just my opinion. Regardless of budget deficiencies, > every employee at NASA and the sub-contractors have the power to stop a > mission in its tracks by calling an anonymous phone number and describing it > (assuming their own management was turning a deaf ear to their concerns). > Therefore, no amount of compressed schedules or other pressures to get the > job done should count as a root cause for a shuttle accident. Correct me if > I'm wrong, but faster, better, cheaper never applied to manned-space flight. > > 2. The reasons why NASA removed those members mentioned below from the > safety advisory council should be looked into, but the reasons they gave for > worry about shuttle missions do not seem to apply to STS-107 either. It's > speculation at this point, but no existing evidence thus far indicates a > fault with aging equipment, short manpower, or any other issue. My own > opinion was the panelists were removed because they could not provide any > *meaningful* advice on how to address shuttle safety concerns. For example: > highlighting a need to protect the shuttle from falling ice is a specific > problem that can be assessed and addressed. Hazy, vague statements like > "nobody will know for sure when the safety margin has been eroded too far" > is difficult to implement a solution. > > Throwing money blindly doesn't solve problems. To my knowledge, the only > major safety cutback in the space program was abandoning an escape vehicle > for the ISS. Did this panel mention any specific upgrade that was delayed? > Does it apply to STS-107? > > 3. Overconfidence in shuttle design? This may be a valid concern. Wasn't > it Columbia's maiden voyage that returned with significant (~30%) thermal > tile loss. If I recall, that was a big concern and addressed. However, it > may have instilled a false confidence that the shuttle is not at risk if > only a few tiles are damaged/lost. The engineers that made the call that > STS-107 are in the best position to determine if they made an oversight > based in overconfidence. > > If the accident was caused by a chunk of ice damaging critically damaging > the wing component, then would increasing the number of engineers that made > the call have solved the problem? More specifically, what budget constraint > could be attributed to allowing this error to occur? > > > On another tact: has anyone ever looked into having a remote control rover > with a camera that could be launched in orbit to perform a "self check" of > shuttle surfaces? Might be useful for ISS too? The camera could be > controlled and reviewed by ground engineers to keep this from bogging down > the astronaut's schedule. > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Bruce Moomaw [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > Sent: Monday, February 03, 2003 1:03 AM > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Cc: Simon Mansfield; ISSDG; Jupiter List; Europa Icepick; Jeffrey Bell > Subject: From tonight's NY Times editorial > > > > > http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/03/opinion/03MON1.html > > ...Beyond the technical inquiry, it will be imperative to look more broadly > at the space agency's management of the shuttle program. It is disquieting > to note that only last year the outgoing chairman of the Aerospace Safety > Advisory Panel told Congress that he had never been so worried about shuttle > safety as right now, mostly because safety upgrades were being postponed due > to budget constraints. Although safety had not yet been compromised, he > said, "nobody will know for sure when the safety margin has been eroded too > far." Five of nine members of that safety panel and two consultants were > removed, with some now accusing NASA of trying to suppress their criticism. > > Then there is the perplexing issue of the mind-set at NASA. The immediate > cause of the Challenger accident 17 years ago was a faulty seal on a booster > rocket that failed to close properly in cold weather, allowing hot gases to > escape and trigger a conflagration. But the deeper cause was institutional. > The seal problems had been analyzed for years by NASA, and the consensus was > always that the shuttles were safe to fly. That confidence grew stronger > with each passing flight - until it was blown to smithereens on a cold day > in January 1986. > > When listening to NASA officials at their initial press conference on the > Columbia accident, it was hard not to wonder if history could be repeating > itself. Shuttle managers acknowledged that debris had broken away from the > external tank on another recent shuttle flight. It hit one of the booster > rockets, causing superficial damage, but was judged not to threaten shuttle > safety. When debris broke loose again on this flight and hit the shuttle's > wing, experts concluded that this event, too, did not threaten safety. > Several years ago shuttles suffered tile damage from debris impacts and even > lost portions of tiles, a problem said to be resolved. Always the damage was > judged no threat to safety. Nobody knows if the debris shed during > Columbia's launch caused this accident, but if it turns out to be the > culprit, investigators will need to analyze how the technical reviews came > to discount the problem. [ See > http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/03/national/03WRON.html .] > > With the future of NASA and the shuttle program hanging on the outcome, the > investigation must be as open and forthright as possible. It is perfectly > appropriate for NASA and its contractors to take the lead in analyzing the > technical failure. But it is discouraging that NASA, which famously tried to > cover up its shortcomings in the early stages of the Challenger > investigation, has chosen to convene an oversight board of safety officials > from military and civilian agencies to give its investigation credibility. > Whatever the qualifications of those individuals, they have neither the > stature nor true independence needed for an accident of this magnitude. An > independent presidential commission with distinguished members from the > private sector investigated the Challenger accident. President Bush should > appoint a similar panel to investigate this one while Congress pursues its > own inquiries. _______________________ > > I will add only that CNN has also started quoting comments from various > skeptical observers regarding the "independence" of that safety board. > > > > > > > == > You are subscribed to the Europa Icepick mailing list: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Project information and list (un)subscribe info: http://klx.com/europa/ > == You are subscribed to the Europa Icepick mailing list: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Project information and list (un)subscribe info: http://klx.com/europa/
