> -----Original Message----- > From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > > In the case of a person suffering from a terminal disease, it > is much more > likely that he will survive in a branch where he was not > diagnosed with the > disease, than in a branch where the disease is magically > cured. The latter > possibility (conventional qti) can't be favoured above the first just > because the surviving person is more similar to the original person.
I don't understand this argument. The person survives (according to QTI) in both branches. In fact QTI postulates that an infinite number of copies of a person survives (although the *proportion* of the multiverse in which he survives tends to zero - but that is because the multivese is growing far faster than the branches in which a person survives). QTI postulates that ALL observer moments are part of a series (of a vast number of series') which survive to timelike infinity. > You could object that in the first case your consciousness is somehow > transferred to a different person (you ``jump´´ to a > different branch that > separated from the dying branch before you were diagnosed), > but I would say > that the surviving person has the same consciousness the > original person > would have if you cured his disease and erased all memory of > having the > disease. That isn't necessary (according to QTI). The multiverse is large enough to accomodate an uncountable infinity of branches in which a given person survives from ANY starting state, as well as a (larger) uncountable infinity in which he doesn't. Charles
