Another thought on the Bayesian / SSA argument. Suppose (recent cosmological discoveries aside) that we discovered that the universe was going to fall back on itself into a big crunch in, say, 1 googol years' time. In such a universe QTI could still operate, but would only operate until the big crunch, which would act as a cul-de-sac. Now the SSA would say that typically you'd "expect to find yourself" (whatever that means) with an age around 0.5 googol, but that nevertheless there was a finite chance that you'd "find yourself" at age, say, 20. So assuming the SSA is valid for a moment, it wouldn't rule out QTI (although it would make it seem rather unlikely) if we discussed it when aged 20 in a closed universe. But it would be *impossible* if had the same discussion in an open universe! Odd that the average density of our branch of the multiverse should make all the difference to a theory based on the MWI . . . odd too (though not impossible) that the distant future history of the universe should determine the probability of events in the present . . .
(BTW, would I be right in thinking that, applying the SSA to a person who "finds himself" to be 1 year old, the chances that he'll live to be 80 is 1/80?) Charles > -----Original Message----- > From: Russell Standish [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > Sent: Wednesday, 12 September 2001 12:35 p.m. > To: Charles Goodwin > Cc: "Everything-List (E-mail)" > Subject: Re: Conventional QTI = False > > > The reason for failure of Jacques' argument is no. 1) from Charles's > list below, which he obviously thought of independently of me. I > originally posted this at > http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m583.html, on 10th May > 1999. Unfortunately, I couldn't find where the orginal SSA argument > was posted - perhaps this was via some other papers. > > The discussion that followed over the following year was quite > interesting at times, and boringly technical at other times. It > clarified a number of technical concepts, in particular what became > known as the ASSA - which seems exactly like point 3) of Charles's > post below: random hoppings of some "soul" between observer > moments. Despite your protestations to the contrary Jacques, which I > never found convincing. > > By contrast, "soul hopping" does not happen in the usual formulation > of QTI, although I grant it is a feature of some computational > theories of immortality based on infinite sized universes. > > I find it very droll that Jacques attempted to tar his opposition's > theories with the very same brush that tars his own ASSA theory. > > The point of this is not to say that QTI is true (for which I > retain my > usual degree of scepticism), but simply that the Jacques Mallah SSA > argument simply does not work as a counter argument. > > Cheers > > Charles Goodwin wrote: > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: Jacques Mallah [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > > > > > > >From: Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > > >I suspect you are trying to find ways of making QTI > compatible with > > > >Jacques ASSA based argument, when it is clear his argument fails > > > >completely. Not that the argument is unimportant, as the > reasons for > > > >the failure are also interesting. > > > > > > What the hell are you babbling about? > > > > I don't know whether he's thinking about my objections to > the SSA argument, but mine certainly *appear* to undermine it > (at least I > > haven't yet heard a good reason why they don't). Briefly, > (1) the SSA argument neglects the fact that even with an > infinitely long > > worldline, everyone must pass through every age from 0 > upwards, which is precisely what we observe. It also (2) > ignores a selection > > effect, namely that only in a thermodynamically low number > of universes can a person who is not "QTI-old" expect to > communicate with > > someone who *is* (and hence 99.999999999999...% of > discussion groups will necessarily be composed of "QTI-young" > people). The SSA > > argument also (3) gives the strong impression (though this > could *perhaps* be argued away) that it relies on us treating our > > worldlines as though we've just been "dropped" into them at > some random point, like Billy Pilgrim; which is, of course, not what > > happens in reality. > > > > Maybe there are some more technical objections to the SSA > argument, but these are the simplest and most obvious. > > > > Charles > > > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------- > -------------- > Dr. Russell Standish Director > High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, > 8308 3119 (mobile) > UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965, 0425 > 253119 (") > Australia [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
