Jacques Mallah wrote:
> >From: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > >Jacques Mallah wrote: > > `` I have repeated pointed out the obvious consequence that if that were > >true, then a typical observer would find himself to be much older than the > >apparent lifetime of his species would allow; the fact that you do not find > >yourself so old gives their hypothesis a probability of about 0 that it is > >the truth. However, they hold fast to their incomprehensible beliefs.´´ > > > >According to FIN, however, the probability of being alive at all is almost > >zero, which contradicts our experience of being alive. > > Whatchya mean? I wouldn't mind acquiring a new argument against FIN to > add to the ones I give, but your statement doesn't appear to make any sense. You wrote earlier that consciousness can't be transferred to a copy. But consciousness isn't transferred, the copies had the same consciousness already because they were identical. I would say: I exist because somewhere I am computed. You appear to say that (forgive me if I am wrong) I must identify myself with one computation. Even an identical computation performed somewhere else will have a different identity. My objection is that the brain is constantly changing due to various processes. The typical timescales of these processes is about a millisecond. FIN thus predicts that I shouldn't find myself alive after a few milliseconds. Saibal
