Jesse Mazer wrote:
> >Those specifications have to make physical processes NOT turing > >emulable, for Chalmers' idea being coherent. The price here would be an > >explicit NON-COMP assumption, and then we are lead outside my working > >hypothesis. In this way his dualism is typically non computationalist. > > Why would Chalmers' version of dualism be non-computationalist? That would depend on whether you are dealing with consciousness-is-computation computationalism or cognition-is-computation computationalism. > As I > understand him, he does argue that there is a one-to-one relationship > between computations and conscious experiences, But not an identity relationship. > and he certainly believes > that a sufficiently detailed simulation of a brain would *behave* just like > the original. But that is underpinned by psychophysical laws, not identity. > Anyway, without tying my argument to closely to Chalmers' beliefs, what I > meant when I talked about "psychophysical laws" was just a rule for deciding > when a copy of a particular computation has been instantiated physically, > with each instantiation contributing to the total measure of that > computation. What Chalmers means is something much more metaphysical. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---