Just to clarify, my 'extended' version of physicalism isn't intended to 
replace the standard version, which accepts the existence of elementary 
particles, the Big Bang etc (QM is a more complicated and partly unsettled 
issue). It just focusses on certain forms of brain activity corresponding 
to thoughts.

If meaning is given by common use, then 'thought' - not a technical term - 
is confined to awake humans (and perhaps their dreams, and conceivably also 
a few other creatures) . . . for now. Meanings can change over time.

Alastair  


On Saturday, February 21, 2026 at 10:46:21 PM UTC Brent Meeker wrote:

> A lot of biological information isn't even instantiated in neuronal 
> activity, it's in one's "gut" metaphorically speaking.
>
> I seems to me that a common mistake in idealism is to take consciousness 
> as the whole of thought.  Yet we know that (c.f. Poincare') most thought is 
> unconscious information processing.
>
> Brent
>
>
> On 2/21/2026 2:16 AM, Alastair wrote:
>
> Most of this is fascinating, insightful and deep - from what I can 
> understand of Parts I to IV. (I am wondering: did you have more than 
> cosmetic help from AI?)
>
> I would also be interested to know your definition of 'information' (as 
> bitstrings or equivalent? or as their chosen interpretation? or something 
> else?). Semantic imprecision can be a barrier to adequate understanding and 
> agreement in these (and many other) kinds of situation, so good definitions 
> are important.
>
> My own preferred version of physicalism has thought events as mass neural 
> events and so can include ideas, concepts etc, including thoughts in and 
> about a language, any of which could in theory be correct or incorrect (the 
> physical laws underpinning those events operate correctly regardless). It 
> would not appear to fall foul of any of the criticisms in part I of the 
> article if these are framed outside the context of information as being 
> ontologically primary; ie from this point of view physicalism is 
> self-consistent, in this version of it at least, and so contradicts the 
> assertion that ontologically primary information is the only 
> self-consistent position available. 
>
> We may well have already detected electrical signals corresponding to 
> thoughts and could even one day decode them, if we can for example 
> individualise them to key neurons or assemblies and then bulk-analyse them 
> across macro-time; but I don't understand sufficiently to say whether or 
> not this this would refute the idea that information is ontologically 
> primary - this brings us back to the definition of information used, and 
> perhaps also to that of 'computational structures'. 
>
> Alastair
>
>
> On Sunday, February 15, 2026 at 8:52:30 AM UTC Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>> Hello everyone,
>>
>> I’m sharing the continuation of The Sapiens Attractor.
>>
>> If you’re interested in the deeper structure behind the idea, you can 
>> read it here:
>>
>>
>> https://allcolor.medium.com/the-sapiens-attractor-maximal-informational-realism-and-the-god-loop-26393e34fa46
>>
>> Hope you’ll enjoy it.
>> Best,
>> Quentin 
>>
>> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy 
>> Batty/Rutger Hauer)
>>
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